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iiABSTRACT
This paper considers alternatives to  disperse the accumulated pension rights during the
liquidation phase or retirement. First, the paper classifies the risks that affect pensioners,
discusses the  defined benefit  and  defined  contribution options,  and classifies pension
contracts according  to the type of  risk they transfer to  the  worker. It  considers fixed
annuities, variable annuities, CREF annuities, and programmed  withdrawals. This part is
a description of the production function  for pensions  and annuities.  Second, the paper
offers a  discussion  of the restrictions  that  should  be  imposed  by mandatory  pension
systems on the  menu of pension  contracts.  One  section  discusses  whether lump  sum
withdrawals should be allowed and the other discusses if there should be a mandate to
annuitize wealth.  The argument  that  the annuitization  should  be  mandated to  prevent
adverse selection is rejected on the basis of Chilean evidence.
..1. Introduction
Most of the recent literature on pension reform has focused on the design of the
accumulation phase, in which workers contribute and earn pension rights over time. In
contrast, this paper is concerned with the alternatives to disperse the accumulated pension
rights  during the  liquidation  phase.  This topic  is  becoming  increasingly critical  for
countries  in  Eastern  Europe  such  as Latvia and  Poland,  who  added unconventional
pension  formulae to their notional account pillars, and for Latin America, as the AFP-
type systems move toward maturity and the need to improve the initial Chilean design
becomes apparent.
Pension contracts are of interest for all workers that enter the retirement age. For
simplicity, let us assume that the worker already chose the amount of resources which he
wants  to  bequest and used  it to  buy a  bequest-annuity contract that provides  for his
desired pattem of bequests. The remaining portion of his wealth is the one that he chose
to consume. The problem is how to liquidate this amount over his remaining life, whose
duration is uncertain. Consider two ways to liquidate a fund, in a concrete case where the
worker has accumulated wealth equivalent to 60 monthly salaries, where life expectancy
is given by the 1985 Chilean mortality table for male annuitants in which life expectancy
at age 70 is 13.34 years and for which the annuity factor is 117.32 when the annual real
interest rate is 4%:
(Ia)  P = 60-0.04/12 = 20.0% of a monthly salary if he consumes interest alone;
(lb)  P' =  60/117.32 =  51.1.%  of a monthly salary if he annuitizes his wealth.
In (la) the worker consumes just the interest earned, in order to assure himself of
a  steady pension  even if  he  lives to  a very  advanced  age. In  (lb)  he  liquidates the
principal as well, so consumption more than doubles. This happens because P' eliminates
the  unintended bequest that exists in P. As the  worker already purchased his  desired
bequest, the unintended bequest is of no value to him. As P' > P and in both approaches
the risk of outliving savings is reduced to zero, the annuity P' is dominant for every risk
averse worker.
The first aim of this paper is to offer an economic road map to the wide menu of
pension  and  annuity  contracts  that  have been  devised  around the  world.  Section  2
classifies the risks that affect pensioners and point out which are diversifiable and which
are not. Section 3 discusses how to manage non diversifiable risks. The main options are
to buy a guarantee from somebody else - the defined benefit option - and to bear the risk
1oneself - the defined contribution option. Section 4 classifies pension contracts according
to  the type  of  risk  they  transfer to  the  worker. It  discusses  fixed annuities,  variable
annuities and CREF annuities. Then it offers a discussion of the programmed withdrawal
formula, which  is  shown  to  be  constrained  optimal  for  some  preference  parameters.
Finally,  section  4  explains  how  annuity  contracts  allow  flexibility  to  choose  the
retirement age, the time trend of pension payments and the size and timing of bequests.
Sections 2, 3 and 4 can be understood  as a description  of the production function  for
pensions and annuities.
The second  part of this paper offers a  preliminary discussion of the restrictions
that should be imposed by mandatory pension systems on the menu of pension contracts.
Section 5 discusses whether lump sum withdrawals should  be allowed in a  mandatory
pension system. We argue that it is inconsistent to mandate saving for old age and at the
same time allow lump sum withdrawals. We propose a compromise in which the size of
mandatory  savings  is  reduced,  increasing  the  scope  of  voluntary  savings  and  free
dispersion of assets. This  section shows also that prohibiting  lump-sum withdrawals  is
subject  to  technical  difficulties,  but  that  arrangements  such  as  CREF  annuities
supplemented by a mortality reinsurance pool could be useful to manage them.
Section  6  discusses  if  there  should  be  a  mandate  to  annuitize  wealth  in  a
mandatory  pension  system,  or  conversely,  whether  phased  withdrawals  should  be
allowed. The argument that the latter should  not be allowed  because adverse  selection
may emerge is rejected on the basis of the Chilean experience.  In that country, a large
proportion - 42% in 1996 - of those that retire at the legal age choose immediate annuities
over programmed withdrawal, so adverse selection is not substantial. A second argument
is that prohibition  of phased withdrawals is undesirable, unless options such as variable
and CREF annuities  are available,  because if so workers  would be forced to  purchase
investment and  demographic.guarantees.  A third argument  is that phased  withdrawals
must be allowed  in order to assure workers refuge from  non-benevolent redistributions
due to manipulation  of official mortality tables. Finally, we consider the argument  that
paternalistic concerns lead to  a prohibition  of real annuities  that  decrease over  time  -
requiring either flat or growing real annuities - and also to a prohibition of programmed
withdrawals.
22. Classification of risks in pensions
The main risks in pensions can be divided into three main classes: mortality risk,
investment risk and timing riskl.
(a) Mortality risk.  Every pensioner fears  the risk of outliving the resources set
aside for old age. To decompose this risk, it is useful to consider the duration of life for a
group of 1,000 workers of the same age and sex that are about to take a pension.
It is clear that some of them will live just  a few years and others will live much
more. The risk of living more than the average for the group can be designated as the
"individual mortality risk". This risk can be completely diversified away as is the case in
annuity contracts and in mandatory defined benefit pension systems. Risk sharing occurs
because the resources freed by those that die earlier than expected are used to finance a
continuation of pensions for those that outlive the average.
But there is a nondiversifiable component in this risk as well. This is given by the
risk that the average longevity of the group turns  out to  be  different  from what  was
initially  expected. Such outcomes  are frequent,  as  medical  discoveries may  lengthen
average life while new diseases and environmental disasters may shorten average life, or
simply  because the  insurer  makes a  mistake  when  estimating  average  longevity  for
clients. We designate this component as "demographic risk" (Valdes and Edwards, 1997).
The financial significance of demographic risk can be seen with a simple actuarial
calculation. Taking the official life table for males in Chile, Valdes and Edwards (1997)
seek the required permanent increase in the rate of return on assets needed to compensate
the financial cost of an increase in life expectancy of two years. Their simulations show
that the required permanent increase is 65 basis points per year, which is very significant.
Indeed, it is most likely that this increase cannot be achieved, which requires the pension
to fall by 4.1%.
Even in a large country such as the United States, demographic risk realizations
have exhibited substantial variation. The annual rate of mortality improvement for males
was  -0.19%  per  year  in  1954-68 and  1.56% per  year  in  1968-88  (Social  Security
Technical  Panel,  1991).  The  cumulative  impact  of  these  changes  can  increase  life
expectancy  substantially.  For  example,  under  simplifying  assumptions  a  mortality
improvement  of  1.56% per  year,  accumulated over  20  years  (1968-88),  increases a
1  We ignore  "expense  risk'. This  is the risk  that actual  future expenses  may  be larger than
anticipated. Expense  risk is the subject  of some  regulation  by Insurance  Commissioners.
3median life expectancy of 15 years to 20.7 years - a total of 5.7 years2. Adjustment to this
shock requires  a  substantial  reduction  in  pensions  or a  substantial  increase in  taxes.
(b) Investment risk. The worker that is about to start a pension owns an amount of
resources and wants to use it to finance his expenditure during old age. He needs a store
of value to transfer these resources over time. Investment risk is defined as the risk that
the purchasing power of this store of value may change over time.
Some aspects of investment risk may  be diversifiable and others  may not.  We
argue that this  decomposition depends  of the  institutional setting.  In countries with  a
varied equity market, investment risk can be diversified by forming portfolios composed
of many different stocks. If the country has a corporate bond market, diversification can
proceed in this dimension too.
Of course, if a  country allows residents to  invest abroad - not common  in developing
countries - then  investment risk  can be  diversified much further through  international
investment in  equities,  corporate bonds,  property and bonds issued  by many different
governments, not just the local one. However, if the country just  has a few local banks.
then  diversification  is limited  to  certificates  of  deposit, debt  issued  by the  domestic
government and local real estate.
Generally  speaking, the non-diversifiable  component of  investment risk can be
subdivided into three main classes:
(i) capital risk. This risk materializes when the investment portfolio falls in price.
This may be due to falls in equity prices, impairment of the bond portfolio by corporate
or sovereign defaults, or drops in property prices.
(ii) reinvestment risk, or maturity mismatching risk 3. It arises when at least some
portion of the assets will have to be reinvested in the future, at an interest rate which is
uncertain now. Examples are bonds that are amortized or called, real estate whose lease
expires, and dividends paid out by equities.
(iii) inflation risk. We argue below that the classification of inflation risk as non
diversifiable depends heavily of the institutional setting.
2 If the mortality  rate q were independent  of age, then it would  be related to the median life
expectancy  L through the relation  (1-q)L  = 0.5.  This  can be used to show that for an initial Lo  =
15,  a cumulative  mortality  improvement  that reduces  the associated  qo to q = qo(1-0.0156) 20
implies  that median life  expectancy  is raised to L = 20.67  years  in the final situation.
3 This  name is used in defined  benefit plans and fixed  annuities,  because  reinvestment  risk can be
driven  to zero if the duration (average  maturity)  of fixed-income  assets  (guaranteed  by their
issuer)  is made equal to the duration (average  maturity)  of the liabilities  guaranteed  by the plan
(pensions  or annuities).
4The relative size of these three risks is of interest. Capital risk is substantial with
regards to equities  and real  estate. Equity  prices fell some 50% in  the United States
during 1973-74, and have fallen by more in some developing countries. This risk can be
managed by increasing the share of the portfolio invested in fixed income securities, such
as  bonds.  Reinvestment  risk  appears  to  be  smaller  than  equity  risk,  although  still
respectable. As  an illustrative example, the annuity that can be purchased with a fixed
single premium,  when  life expectancy  is  18 years, falls  15% in  value if  funds are
reinvested at  2%  real rather than 4%  real.  This  risk can be  managed  by choosing a
portfolio  of  fixed  income  securities  whose  duration (average  maturity)  matches  the
duration of expected  payments. Inflation  risk  can easily be larger than  equity risk. If
inflation rises from 2% to  10% per year, as it did in the United States from the 1960's to
the late 1970's, the impact on the real value of the nominal pension to be paid 15 years
after issue will drop by 68%. In addition to being the potentially most damaging, inflation
risk is the least manageable by individual portfolio managers, so we discuss it further.
The classification  of inflation risk  as non diversifiable depends  heavily of the
institutional  setting.  If  CPI-indexed  long-term  bonds are not  available,  then  funded
pension systems cannot offer CPI-indexed ("real") annuities unless a guarantor puts up
substantial equity capital, which in turn make real annuities very expensive.
It turns  out  that  if the tax  base  is the  appropriate one,  inflation risk may  be
diversified  through  the  tax  system.  A  govermment can commit  to  pay  CPI-indexed
transfers if enough revenue is levied from aggregates that increase in proportion to CPI
inflation. This is the case in pension  systems financed with the pay-as-you-go method,
which  collect  taxes  on  the formal  sector  wage  bill,  an  aggregate  closely related to
consumer expenditure.  This  close  relation  explains the  ability  of  unfunded  pension
systems to pay CPI-indexed pensions.
However, this  is  not  a  fundamental  advantage of pay-as-you-go  finance over
funded pensions,  as has  been claimed by  Barr (1993, p. 214). CPI-indexed long-term
bonds are available  in the United Kingdom, whose government has issued CPI-indexed
bonds since 1982. In Chile, there have been CPI-indexed mortgages, CPI- indexed bank
bonds, CPI-indexed corporate bonds and CPI-indexed Central Bank bonds4. Thus CPI-
indexed annuities  are  available both  in  the  United Kingdom and  Chile.  As the  US.
41n Chile,  issuers  of CPI-irndexed  debt are families  who  buy homes,  firms who sell  in the domestic
consumer  market and the government,  who collects  tax revenue  from consumers  through  the
value added  tax.
5government  began to sell CPI-indexed bonds, TIAA-CREF began to offer  CPI-indexed
annuities.
The ability to diversify inflation risk through the financial market depends heavily
of the institutional  setting. If tax and regulatory treatment  is equalized, privately issued
CPI-indexed  securities may emerge  in the  future  in  Canada,  Mexico and  the  United
States, whose governments have already issued CPI-indexed debt.
Inflation  risk cannot be  diversified  fully  in  the  financial markets  of  countries
without CPI-indexed long term debt5. The options for insurers and pension plans in those
countries are to auarantee inflation risk by putting up equity capital, or simply to transfer
this risk to the pensioner themselves6. Due to the high standard deviation of inflation for
long horizons, the amount of equity capital needed would probably be quite large, so the
cost  of the guarantee would also be large, making  real annuities very expensive.  Thus,
insurers around the world have chosen the second option and simply pass along inflation
risk  to  pensioners. Because of this,  we may say that the nominal annuities  offered by
insurance companies and pension plans are "defined contribution" regarding the inflation
risk, as explained in the next section.
(c) Timing risk. This is the risk of changing exposure to any of the previous risk at
an unfavorable time, say shifting into a fixed income portfolio just before interest rates
increase,  or  buying  a  mortality  guarantee  just  before  expense  charges  fall.  The
counterpart of this risk is the opportunity of changing this exposure at a favorable time.
Many authors have argued that pension  systems that put a deadline  (such as a
fixed pension  age) for the worker to  convert his  accumulation into an annuity  expose
workers to timing risk, because this may turn out to be the wrong timing if the underlying
equities fall in price temporarily just  before purchase7. However, we argue  in section 4.7
that "timing" risk is a result of allowing workers the freedom to reallocate their portfolio.
5 Some diversification  may  be obtained by investing  in short term debt, because  the short term
nominal interest rate does respond somewhat to inflation. However, this strategy increases
reinvestment  risk.
6Escalating nominal annuities, where the annual escalation factor is equal to expected inflation,
are not a solution. Such contracts pay a constant real annuity on average, but its purchasing
power is still risky. If expected inflation and the escalating factor are both equal to 2% per year
but actual inflation turns out to be 4% per year, then the real pension to be paid 15 years after
issue will be 25% below expectations.
7 For example, see Diamond (1977) p. 280  and World Bank (1994),  p. 330.
63. Approaches to manage non diversifiable risk: DB and DC
The methods to deal with non diversifiable risks can be divided into three classes.
The first  one is to transfer the risk  to another agent, through  a contractual guarantee,
paying a price or risk premium8. The second is to let each participant bear his own share
of the aggregate risk. A third approach is to endow a board of trustees with the power to
redistribute wealth between agents, in the hope that it might find a mutually beneficial
trade that cannot be achieved in an incomplete market. We develop these ideas now.
3.1 Defined benefit and defined contribution contracts
One  way  of  seeing  the  distinction  between  defined  benefit  and  defined
contribution is that the former has separate provisions setting benefits and contributions,
that do not match automatically from a financial point of view. Thus, a guarantor must
exist to cover deficits or to absorb surpluses in DB plans.  Instead, defined contribution
contracts link benefits and contributions in such a way that financial equilibrium always
obtains ex-post. Thus, there is no nieed  for a guarantor.
The essential feature of "defined benefit" contracts is that there is an entity that
guarantees one or more nondiversifiable risks, such as investment and demographic risk
(Davis, 1995, p. 230-4). This entity can be an insurance company, an employer or future
generations of taxpayers. This is proven by the fact that when the guarantor of a defined
benefit  plan goes bankrupt or  does  not honor its commitment,  the plan ceases to  be
"defined benefit", and its status changes to defined contribution. An example is the fixed
annuity contract, where the pension is guaranteed by a life insurance company. The most
common guarantor is the government, that stands for future taxpayers.
Now  consider "defined contribution"  contracts. In this case there is no entity  to
guarantee benefits directly. Thus, non diversifiable risk must be divided amongr  individual
members, who bear their share of the risk directly.
It  is sometimes  thought that  defined contribution plans  are characterized by  a
fixed contribution  rate over time.  This  is incorrect, as the  financial equilibrium of  a
defined contribution plan obtains also with time-varying and even random contribution
rates.
8 Mitchell  et al (1997),  who analyze  voluntary  annuities  in the United  States,  report that the
difference  between  the expected  value of annuities  and their price or premium  is a puzzle.  That
difference  should  be due, at least  in part, to the risk  premium charged  by life  insurance
companies  for taking  up nondiversifiable  investment  and demographic  risks.
7It is sometimes said that a 401(k) plan with a fixed annuity option is DC. This is
correct for the accumulation phase only, so it would be more precise  to say that such a
plan is a mixture in which the accumulation phase is DC and the annuity portion is DB.
3.2 Direct and indirect investment risk guarantees
In the case of investment risk, it is possible to purchase guarantees in the financial
markets, substituting partially  for the pension  guarantor. When  a  defined contribution
plans  invests in  fixed  income  securities,  it purchases  the guarantee  provided  by  the
issuers,  which  may  be  quite  reliable.  That  is  why  the  "defined  benefit"  pensions
guaranteed by the government of a small country may be less reliable  than the pensions
offered  by  a  "defined  contribution"  plan  invested  in  debt  securities  issued  by  the
government of a major economy9. In the United Kingdom, some  investment banks are
offering pensions invested in mutual funds that  purchase put options  to guarantee their
return (Planned Savings, May 1996).
Similarly, when the assets that back defined benefit pensions are invested in fixed
income securities, the guarantor relieves himself of most of the costs and rewards of that
role,  which is  implicitly transferred to  the issuers  of those  securities.  This  procedure
allows life insurance companies to operate safely with a high leverage.
However, as  financial  markets are  less  than  complete,  they  seldom  allow the
purchase of as many guarantees as those provided by the direct guarantor of the pension
contract, the remaining risk is of maj  or interest.
3.3 Contractual and discretionary guarantees
Financial  markets  trade  guarantees  that  are  bilateral  contracts.  Ex-ante;  the
contract is designed to maximize its value for both parties. For example, the risk for the
pensioner may be smoothed over time by adding experience-rating clauses to the pension
contract. However, experience must be measured in an objective way, say by following a
market  price  index,  because  ex-post  the  parties  will  have  opposing  interests.
An alternative approach is to designate  a board of trustees,  who should behave
benevolently, and entrust it with the task of dividing risks equitably  over time  between
the different classes of beneficiaries of the trust and its guarantor. The trustees are a third
party to the contract, who  exercise their discretion.  The guarantees  generated by these
9 The investrnent risk for the pensioner can be eliminated if the plan invests in long-term fixed
income securities of the same duration of expected liabilities (pensions).
8trilateral  contracts  may  be  termed  "discretionary  guarantees".  If  discretion  is  used
benevolently,  it  might  reduce  total  risk  by  redistributing  outcomes  ex-post  in  an
incomplete markets setting.
An example of risk-bearing through discretion is "participating" life insurance, in
which  policy  dividends are determined by  a  board  of trustees.  In  the  "with-profits"
annuities marketed in the United Kingdom, the rate of return credited to  annuitants  is
deternined  by a board of trustees on their best judgment, rather than through a formula
set in the contract. Another example is given by occupational pension plans in the United
Kingdom and the United States. But the most prevalent example is given by legislated
defined-benefit pension plans, which are usually mandatory, state managed and financed
on a pay-as-you-go basis.
When  comparing  with  contractual  risk  sharing,  discretionary  risk  sharing  is
subject to a moral hazard problem. By moral hazard we mean that trustees may not act
benevolently but rather seek self-interest or the interests of their true principals by virtue
of other contracts (Valdes, 1997). If abuse occurs, the guarantee may not be worth much.
If discretionary actions go so far that aggregate risk is increased, the beneficiaries become
willing to pay to get rid of this "guarantee",  whose value becomes negative.
In the  case of  participating life insurance, the Armstrong  Commission  (1905)
complained about the criteria used by the boards of trustees of life insurance companies
to assign available resources between policy dividends and other uses, such as executive
compensation. These worries led New York state to issue regulations that require policy
dividends to be above a minimum of 95% of net investment income (Black and Skipper,
1994).
In  the  case  of  defined-benefit  occupational  pension  plans,  the  employer
announces a guarantee of benefits. However, the employer may reserve the right or power
to modify some of the terns  of the guarantee. For example, the Goode Report (1993) in
the  United  Kingdom  showed  that  the  "guarantee"  announced  by  defined-benefit
occupational pension  plans  in  that  country  was  discretionary, because  the  board  of
trustees had the legal right to reduce benefits already accruedl 1 . Although trustees have
the legal obligation to  exercise their power benevolently, the fact is that most  of such
10As  pointed  out by the Goode  Report  (1993),  who asked for decisive  reform  in this matter, this
situation  was the  result  of considering  pensions  to be a promise  of donation or grant by the
employer,  and thus  subject  to unilateral  modification.  The  moral  hazard occurs  when the worker,
in anticipation  of such promised  payments,  accepts  a reduction  in take-home  wages.  If this
reduction  happens,  then the pension promise  is an accrued  right and should not be subject  to
unilateral  reduction.  But this means that the guarantee  for non diversifiable  risks  offered  by the
employer  ceases  to be discretionary  and becomes  contractual.
9boards are designated by the guarantor  (employer). The presence of another contract, in
this case the employment contract, that makes the trustee the agent of one of the parties
(the guarantor) increases the risk of moral hazard.
This was also the case in "private" pensions in the United States until the approval
of  the ERISA  law  in  1974. When  Studebaker  closed  in  1964, the bankruptcy  courts
confirmed that the workers had  no pension rights,  even those  that had contributed  for
decades. However, moral hazard with  respect to the  accrued  rights of workers not  yet
pensioned  continues  to  be  possible  in  the  U.S.  This  happens  when  the  employer-
guarantor chooses to termninate  a defined benefit plan, maybe to replace it with a defined
contribution  plan.  Some  observers  claim  that  ERISA  rules  are  too  lax  to  prevent
deliberate underfunding. In addition,  according to ERISA the guarantee of the employer
to the pension plan is limited to 30% of net worth of the employer (Smallhout, 1996, p.
I 0- 11).  Moral hazard continues to be possible in the many developing countries that limit
their regulation of company pension plans to the tax aspect.
The most significant instance  of discretionary guarantees  are legislated pension
plans, which  are  usually mandatory;  state managed  and  financed  on a  pay-as-you-go
basis. In most  countries the pension  promises  offered  by  these plans do not  have the
status of property rights  owned  by the participants,  because  they can be  amended  by
future laws.  For  example, the  Dini  reform in  Italy  in  1995  reduced significantly  the
pensions of independent workers (Haman, 1997). If the pension  rights of those workers
had  been  expressed  as  accrued  property  rights,  that  reduction  would  have  been
unconstitutional. Another example  is provided by  legislated  increases of the retirement
age.
Of course, legislators are expected to exercise their power benevolently, but moral
hazard  is  possible  because  of  the  constraints  imposed  on  politicians  by  political
competition  and  because  public  finances  are not  transparent  to  non  specialists.  Non
benevolent use of discretion  may  have been the rationale  in  some instances in  which
legislators have switched the asset  mix from funding to pay-as-you-go financing. In the
latter, the asset  that backs pension  promises is the present value of payroll taxes to be
levied  on  future  workers.  This  switch  improves  the  current  cash  balance  in  the
government, which may use it to transfer wealth to the current generation of taxpayers or
transfer recipients. This might benefit politicians by improving their reelection prospects.
If discretion  is used benevolently,  and guarantee markets  are incomplete, it can
reduce total risk by redistributing outcomes ex-post.  But  actions by trustees-legislators
may also increase risk, turning the guarantee into a bet or wager. "Political risk" has been
10defined as the risk that the rules of the pension  system are altered in ways that increase
the risk perceived by workers and pensioners (Diamond,  1997).
Considering the wide range of behavior allowed by discretionary guarantees, one
might question the usual  practice of calling these  promises  "defined benefit".  We can
salvage  the  term  by  saying  that  the  quality  of  a  discretionary guarantee  can  vary
substantially. In a defined  contribution plan there  are no guarantees nor  promises from
others, whatever their quality.
Discretion used  ex-post  can  also  be  understood  as  an  implicit  guarantee. The
government  retains  the  right  to  support  unlucky  pensioners  ex-post,  as  the  British
government did after the Maxwell affair in  1992. Discretionary guarantees managed by
trustees seem to be in-between contractual guarantees and implicit guarantees. Of course,
implicit guarantees are unlikely to be considered a "defined benefit".
3.4 Implications for pension design
The non diversifiable risks in pensions, such as investment and demographic risks,
can be  either borne by  participants  (defined  contribution) or by an external  guarantor
(defined benefit). An important question for mandatory pension systems is which is the
best design.
Our view is that given the large volume of pension promises relative to the size of
an economy, a mandatory demand for guarantees can push the market price of contractual
guarantees  above voluntary  willingness to  pay,  unless the guarantee can be  purchased
indirectly in the financial markets. Indirect purchase is helpful in the case of reinvestment
risk and, provided CPI-indexed bonds are available, also for inflation risk. However, this
is not the case with capital risk and demographic risk. If this presumption is accepted, the
practical  options for large mandatory pension  systems are just  defined contribution (no
guarantee) and discretionary guarantees.
A discretionary guarantee is an evolving hybrid which relies on boards of trustees,
is subject to the dangers of moral hazard and may even lead to risk creation. Trustees that
can take action ex-post may increase risk perceived ex-ante, turning the guarantee into a
bet or gamble. This is more likely to happen if trustees are perceived as unprofessional or
prone  to  moral hazard.  If  this  is  the  alternative,  the  absence of  guarantees  (defined
contribution) might be preferable.
Another lesson of this section is that the choice between the defined contribution
approach  and  discretionary  guarantees  can  be  made  separately  for  each  type  of
nondiversifiable risk. For example, the defined  contribution approach might be  chosen
11with  respect  to  capital  risk,  while  discretionary  guarantees  are  chosen  for  demographic
risks.
A general  rule to recommend  the defined  contribution  approach  over discretionary
guarantees,  or vice  versa,  seems  unwarranted.  Individuals  may  differ  in risk aversion  and
expectations  about  the workings  of discretionary  guarantees,  affecting  their willingness  to
pay  for  such  guarantees-  Thus,  an  option  is  to  allow  workers  to  choose  between
discretionary  DB  plans  and  DC plans.  However,  in  a mandatory  system  many  workers
may  not  have  the  financial  knowledge  to  make  such  a decision.  Thus,  the  government
will  have  to  keep  some  role,  which  should  at  least  include  careful  regulation  of
discretionary  guarantees  to improve  their performance.
4. The menu  of pension  contracts
Pension  contracts  can  be  classified  according  to  the  risks  they  guarantee  or
diversify  away.  Abstracting  from  the  difference  between  contractual  guarantees  and
discretionary  guarantees  and  lumping  them  together,  we  can  classify  the  main  pension
contracts  as in Chart  1.
Chart  1: Pension  contracts  classified  by  approach  to risk
Risk 1: Investment
(Capital  and Reinvestment  risks)
Guaranteed  Division  among  pensioners
(Defined  benefit)  (Defined  Contribution)
.Guaranteed  Fixed  Variable
(Def.  Benefit)  Annuity  Annuity
Risk  2:
Demographic
Division  among  CREF  Annuity  CREF  Annuity
pensioners  matched  with  in other
(Def.  Contrib.)  fixed  income  ?  portfolios
Risk 3: Inflation  risk:  When the inflation  risk is passed along  to annuitants,  the contract  is
"defined  contribution"  in this  dimension.  Annuities  offered  by  insurance  companies  and
pension  plans in many countries  are not guaranteed  regarding  inflation.
Risk  4:  Expense  risk:  This  is the  risk  that  actual  future  expenses  may  be  larger  than
anticipated.  If it is passed  along  to pensioners,  the  contract  is  "defined  contribution"  in
12this dimension. Most fixed annuity contracts leave expense risk with the insurer. Variable
and  CREF annuities  pass along the expense  of investment management, provided  the
annuitant can choose between managers. CREF annuity managers may pass along the full
expense  risk  if  they  participate  in  a  mortality  reinsurance  pool.
Risk 5: Timing risk: This is the risk of changing exposure to any of the previous risk at
tan unfavorable time, say quitting equities just  before they increase in price, or buying an
expense guarantee just  before expense charges fall. The counterpart of this risk  is  the
opportunity of changing this exposure at a favorable time.
In what follows we describe briefly each of these contracts. We also describe two
other pension contracts which arise frequently: tontines and programmed withdrawals.
4.1 The fixed annuity.
This  is  the  standard  annuity  contract  offered  by  life  insurance  companies,
occupational  pension  plans  and  state-managed  defined benefit  pay-as-you-go  pension
systems. There  is a  guarantor that takes  upon itself both  the investment risk  and  the
demographic risk. Thus the pensioner is spared from both these non-diversifiable risks as
long as the guarantee is maintained.
Life  insurance  companies  hedge  most  of  the  investment  risk  by  choosing
portfolios concentrated in fixed income denominated in the same currency as the pension
contract and by trying to match the duration of the asset portfolio and expected liabilities.
This strategy reduces the amount of risk capital that shareholders must put up to back up
their guarantee. It is useful to split the investment guarantee further. In the Unites  States,
life insurance companies and employers that offer defined benefit  "private" pensions  do
not  guarantee the inflation risk. Thus, in  the direction of inflation risk, these pension
contracts are defined contribution in nature. At the same time, they are defined benefit
regarding all other investment risks, which  are guaranteed. In contrast, CPI-indexed or
"real" annuities do guarantee the inflation risk, so they are the only fully defined benefit
pensions guaranteeing all risks.
The size of a pure fixed immediate real annuity is set as follows:
(2) Pt  Ft - E  qx -(1  ry(X-t)J  ÷12  ; Pt+i  = Pt for as long as the insured lives.
x=t
where:
Pt = monthly pension paid every month, in real terms.
Ft  =  price  of  the  pure  annuity,  which  may be  equal  to  the  balance  in  the
individual's savings account at retirement if the worker does not want any bequest. If the
13worker  adds bequests feature to  this pure  annuity,  the price rises  in proportion  to the
expected cost of the bequest, as estimated by the insurer.
qx = probability that the pensioner will be alive at date x given that he was alive at
time  t,  the  purchase  date.  This  set  of  probabilities  is  chosen  by  the  insurer.
Conventionally.  qx  =  0  for  x  >  110  and  qo  =  1.
r = real  internal rate of return  offered by  the insurer  to  the  purchaser  of the
annuity. The purchaser cannot distinguish between r and {qx}.
Defining  R as the  market  interest rate  on  fixed-income  investments  of similar
duration to the expected liability taken up by the insurer, the implicit fee charged by the
insurer is the difference (R-r) applied to the value  Fo of the annuity contract. This  fee
includes the risk premium for the investment and mortality guarantees, the administrative
cost and profit.
The case of r = 0 is interesting because two things happen. First, the implicit fee
charged  by  the  insurer  rises  to  be  R%  of  annuity  assets.  Second,  the  expression  in
parenthesis in equation (2) collapses into the life expectancy at date t, as estimated by the
insurer. This is precisely the case of the new notional  accounts pension  system in Latvia
and Polandl 1. In those countries, the government acts as the insurer  and calculates the
annuity for each individual as (Ft/Life  Expectancy  at date t), so implicitly it sets r = 0.
Assuming that in a free insurance market r would have been positive, this pension system
subjects pensioners to a substantial implicit tax, whose rate can be estimated12 to be:
(2)  t=  1  - {Pt(r-'O)/Pt(r-R-c)}
where:  c =  cost  of provision,  inclutding the risk  premium  for  the  guarantees
involved and administration, expressed as a percentage of assets.
Consider an example. For annuitants with life expectancy of 15 years, in a country
where  R  =  4%  and  c=  1%, calculating  annuities  by  simply  dividing  assets  by  life
expectanev  implies levying  a tax on  pensioners  of  20% of  the total  accumulation  of
pension rights  at retirement. This tax rate is large enough to  induce serious distortions,
especially when levied on top of other taxes.
11  For Poland, see Secirihy  through  Diversity,  July 1996, page 155.
12 The  accuracy  of the estimate  depends  of using  a life table  {qxl that  is not biased.
144.2 The variable annuity.
This  contract is like the  fixed annuity but passes on the investment risk to  the
pensioner.  This  is  achieved by  promising the  payment  of  a  number of  shares  in  an
underlying portfolio. This number is recalculated annually and evolves over time with a
fixed formula. The essentials of the formula used in the United States can be summarized
by:
(3a)  Pt+l  =Pt  (l+rt/l+AIR)  ;  PO  is  set  using  (2)  with  r  =  AIR;  or
(3b)  Nt+l  =  Nt/(l+AIR)  ; No = P0/Vo
where:
Pt =  pension paid to the annuitant over year t [$/year].
rt =  rate of return actually earned by the portfolio during year t.
AIR  =  "assumed  interest  rate",  a  constant  number  set  in  the  contract.
Nt = number of shares to be liquidated and paid to the annuitant over t.
VO=  price of the shares of the portfolio at date 0.
Version (3a) of the variable annuity formula shows that the actual monetary value
of the pension varies according to the difference between the actual return earned by the
portfolio and the AIR. For consistency, both returns must be set either in nominal  or in
real terms. Version (3b) is obtained from (3a) by dividing by the price of one share of the
underlying  portfolio  at time  t  and  using the  definition  of  the rate  of  return  on  the
portfolio. This version allows one to see that the purpose of correcting by the AIR is to
take into account that the value of shares in a mutual fund grows over time  according to
the rate of return, so it is possible to liquidate an ever smaller number of shares and still
get the same pension amount per period.
Demographic risk is guaranteed by the insurance company, because  (3) applies
regardless of the actual mortality of the group of pensioners. If they die more slowly than
predicted by the life table, the insurer must cover the loss.
For  economists,  variable  annuities  appear  natural  because  the  pensioner  can
choose  the  type  of  investment  risk  he  prefers  by  varying  the  underlying  portfolio.
Currently,  life insurance companies  in the United States allow the annuitant to choose
from  dozens  of  portfolios managed  by  different  investment  managers,  and  allow  a
number of free switches per year.
15However, we must point out that variable annuities based on formula  (3) do not
allow pensioners to eliminate investment risk, even when the portfolio is invested in a
long-term  fixed income portfolio with  the  same  duration as  expected  liabilities. This
should not happen, as in the case of perfect matching capital and reinvestment risk have
been guaranteed indirectly by the issuers of the fixed income securities.
To see that this is the case, consider an example in which the AIR is 4%. Market
yields on long term Treasury bonds rise permanently from 4% to  8% during the week in
which the pension is recalculated. Thus, the observed rate of return on the bond portfolio
is negative, so 1  +rt is below  1. As the AIR is fixed at 4%, the pensioner must absorb a
reduction in her pension. From this date  on, the bond portfolio  will yield 8% (the new
market yield) rather than 4%, and if market yields do not change further, this will lead to
increases in the pension amount over time. However, there is no need for this fluctuation
in  pension  amounts because  the  fixed  income  assets continue  paying  the  originally
planned cash flow, regardless of market yield. If the bond portfolio has the same duration
as expected liabilities, the present value of subsequent increases in the pension is cancels
the initial reduction exactly. Formula (3)  is inconsistent with marking assets to market
prices continuously.
In the United States a second NAIC  regulation introduces  additional rigidities.
The regulation precludes AIR from being higher than 5% per year (nominal) 1 3. This is
part of a regulatory attempt to protect consumers  from aggressive sales tactics in which
an exaggerated rate of return is promised.
Given the weight of these regulations, the variable annuity market remained small
in the United States until the  1980's. As  of the late 1960's, more  than 95% of variable
annuity contracts in the  United States were  group  policies (Poterba,  1997). The sales
argument for the variable annuity in the  1960's in the United States was that it affords a
(partial) hedge for  the inflation risk, when  it is  invested in  securities  whose nominal
return is partially correlated with inflation, such as equities. This argument turned out to
be mistaken in the case of supply shocks, such as the oil shock of 1973.
The  1990's has observed a  surge  in  demand for individual  saving  in  so-called
"variable annuities" in the United States. These contracts are a tax-favored vehicle for
savingl4,  which  have this  name only  because  they include  the  option to  buy  a true
13 See section  6 of the "'Model  Variable  Annuity Regulation",  National  Association  of Insurance
Commissioners,  1996, July.  This was kindly  provided  by Mr. Mark  Peazy  from  the NAIC.
14Most  of these  contracts  have been  sold to purchasers that have  already hit the annual limits  on
contributions  to IRAs and  401 (k) plans and  wish  to defer  taxation  on investment  earnings.  The
popularity  of this  savings  vehicle  has increased  further  in the current  U.S. environment  of rising
concern  of baby  boomers  about  their  retirement  and  successful  investment  in equities.
16variable annuity as a payout. The other payout option is simply to cash out and almost all
savers prefer it1 5. Thus, in practice the true variable annuity market remains small in the
United States and elsewhere16.
4.3 CREF annuities.
These  annuity  contracts  pass  along  to  the  pensioner  both  investment  and
demographic risk, so they are truly "defined contribution" in most dimensions. This can
be  done  through  "participating"  or  "with-profits"  annuities  that  share  investment  and
mortality risks, and through CREF annuities.  The difference is that the former rely to a
greater  extent on  discretionary  decisions  by the  insurer,  while  CREF  annuities use  a
formula based  on objective parameters.  Still, CREF annuities  can be  made to rely on
some discretion as well, as explained below.
CREF  annuities  were  invented  by  Duncan  (1952)  and  have  been  marketed
successfully by TIAA-CREF in the United States ever since. TIAA-CREF is a non-profit
organization that manages a multiemployer occupational pension plan that serves college
and university professors, and which manages over 180 billion dollars in assets. Bolivia's
recent pension reform allows CREF annuities  as one of the two payout options, together
with  fixed annuities.  Peru  will  allow,  starting  in  December  1997, a  scheme of  self-
insurance of mortality risk for groups of pensioners without dependents, which is related
to CREF annuities (Superintendencias, 1996, p. 134, 523).
CREF  annuities  promise  the payment  of  a  number  of  "annuity  units"  in  the
underlying portfolio. The  price of  annuity  units  is  recalculated  annually with  a  fixed
formula, which accounts for:
(i)  the  difference  between the  actual  rate  of  return  earned  by  the  underlying
portfolio and the projected interest rate;
(ii) the difference between the actual  mortality experience of the group of plan
members and the expected mortality for that group according to the life table used; and
(iii) changes in  expected mortality  (new mortality tables).  A board  of trustees
exercises its discretion here.
15  I thank Mr.  Jonathan  L. Wooley,  Chief  Individual Annuity  Department  Actuary  at New York
Life  Ins.  Co.,  for this information.  He is not responsible  for my interpretations  of this fact.
16  Palmer  (1997,  p. 17)  proposed recently  the adoption of a modified  variable  annuity for the
Swedish  notional  account  system.  Equation  (3a) would apply with rt redefined to be the actual
growth rate of the aggregate  nominal  wage bill, while  AIR  is redefined as a so-called  "norm"  rate
of return that represents  the expected  rate of growth of the real wage bill. This-proposal  was not
accepted  in Sweden.
17The formulae for the CREF annuity aret 7:
(4a)  Pt,i =  Vt-Ni  where
(4b)  Vt = Ft/ [ Yx Zi Nix-aix(AIR,qxt)]  and
(4c)  Ni = Fi/[Vo-ai(AIR,qx)]
where:
Pt,i = pension amount for individual i in year t.
Vt = price of one "annuity unit" for year t
Ni = number of annuity units owned by individual i.
Ft  =  market  value of  the  aggregate funds at  the  beginning of period  t.  This
depends of the actual rate of return and actual mortality experience.
Nix = number of annuity units to be paid to member i of age x.
aix = actuarial factor that  indicates the expected present discounted number of
times that  annuity units will be  paid to member i now age x, according to the current
mortality table.
AIR = assumed interest rate used to determine aix.
qxt = mortality table used to deternine aix as of recalculation t.
Fi = single premium paid by individual i  to purchase a CREF annuity.
Vo = price of one annuity unit when individual i bought his annuity.
This formula may also be described as a mutual insurance company specialized in
variable annuities, or as a group programmed withdrawal l 8. If in a given year the number
of  deaths  among annuitants  is  less  than  expected, then  the  annuity for  survivors  is
reduced proportionately in the next annual recalculation.
A potential problem with the CREF annuity is that the management company has
a conflict of interest when it has the freedom to select the mortality table when dealing
with new annuitants. To attract a new annuitant, the management company can offer her a
better pension, net of commissions, by being slightly optimistic about her risk, which in
this case  means selecting a  pessimistic mortality table  for her. A better pension  offer
allows  the management company  higher sales growth  for the short term.  In  standard
annuities, such a mistake will bring future losses for the insurer. In CREF annuities it is
other annuitants, who already have bought a contract, who are forced to subsidize the new
annuitant  through  the  mortality  experience  adjustment. This  shows up  as  successive
17 See Duncan (1952),  pages  339-40.
18 See Diaz and Edwards (1994),  who offer a description of the CREF  annuity in Spanish.
18downward adjustments in the price of annuity units (see (4b): the term aix turn out to be
larger than anticipated), which in turn reduce the level of pensions paid to all annuitants.
The uses of this  strategy are not restricted to increase profits. The board of the
management company may set mortality tables to pursue other agendas it may have. For
example,  it  may redistribute  in  favor  of  selected  minorities  by  producing  favorable
mortality tables for them and may choose not to acknowledge the actual mortality tables
for other minorities such as smokers.
Although some market forces such as reputation limit the extent of this problems,
it merits some improvement  in contract design. In the U.S., some states have taken the
extreme position of prohibiting the CREF annuity for commercial insurers. For example,
in  New  York  state,  Regulation  47,  section  50.6,  states  that  "mortality  actually
experienced  shall  (not)  adversely  affect  the  dollar  amount  of  payments",  which
effectively bans CREF annuitiesl 9. Greenough (1990, p. 120-1) reports that in 1952 the
Insurance  Commissioner  Bohlinger  decided  not  to  authorize  competitive  insurance
companies to market the CREF annuity contract in New York. However, TIAA-CREF is
exempted from this regulation by a special-purpose law passed in 1952.
The NAIC (National Association of Insurance Commissioners) has taken a more
liberal approach since 1975. The Model Variable Annuity Regulation, adopted as of 1996
by 23 states including  California, Georgia, Louisiana  and Virginia, requires in section
6.D that:
(1) The mortality factors shall be stipulated in the contract;
(2) The mortality  factor shall be determined from the "Annuity Mortality Table
for 1949, Ultimate", or any modification of that table not having a lower life expectancy
at any age, or, if approved by the commissioner, from another table.
Requirement  (1)  prohibits  the  CREF  annuity  in  its  purest  form,  because  the
mortality table cannot be adjusted over time as mortality expectations change (see. (iii)
above).  Still, the NAIC  regulation does allow the flexibility  of  adjusting pensions  in
proportion to the difference between actual and expected mortality.
Requirement (2) prevents the management company from attracting new business
by  assigning  artificial  mortality  tables to  new  annuitants that  imply  higher pensions,
because  low life  expectancies  are prohibited.  This  solves the  potential  moral  hazard
problem explained above. However, as the official 1949 table does not acknowledge the
impact  of  income  on  mortality,  this  regulation  prevents  equitable  pricing  for  poor
customers.
19  Valdes and Edwards (1997) quote  Mr. Jack Fitzgerald, from the New York Insurance
Commission for pointing out that regulation.
19Recently, Valdes and Edwards (1997) have suggested  alternative regulations that
also eliminate moral hazard,  with  the advantage  of allowing  adjustment over  time  of
mortality expectations. They propose to require management  companies to  transfer the
power of modifying  the mortality table that  applies to  each  potential new buyer  to an
independent committee  of  actuaries-trustees.  In  addition,  they  suggest  to  require  the
management company to keep some amount of capital invested in CREF annuities,  such
as  1% of assets, to  assure that the manager  makes financial  losses when  unfavorable
mortality experience occurs.
CREF annuities based on formula (4), as variable annuities  based on (3), do not
allow pensioners to eliminate investment risk by choosing  a portfolio  invested in fixed
income securities with the same duration as expected liabilities. Thus, the CREF annuity
reported in the lower left-hand side of Chart I is not available in the United States.
4.4 Programmed withdrawal or 'income withdrawal'.
The programmed withdrawal approach is not included in chart 1 because it fails to
diversify away (insure) a diversifiable risk, namely the individual longevity risk. The
programmed withdrawal formula used in the Chilean AFP system since 1981 and in the
UK personal plans since 1995, for a single pensioner, is:
(5)  Pt = Ft - _ qx -(1  r7(X-t)1  12;  Bequest  = Ft  if  the individual dies at  t.
x=t
where:
Pt = maximum monthly pension after recalculation in year t.
Ft = balance in the individual's savings account at the beginning of t.
qx = probability of being alive at date x given that the pensioner is alive at date t.
Conventionally,  qx  =  0  for  x  >  110  and  qt  =  1.
r = a real rate of return on investment. Both r and {qx} are set by the regulators or
by exogenous market indices.
The notion behind the programmed withdrawal formula is that the pensioner may
spend at, a maximum, an amount that assumes he lives for the average life expectancy
and  earns  return  r  on  his  fund.  However,  if  he  turns  out  to  survive  by  the  next
recalculation, then he is doing  better than average (he  is  100% alive  rather than  95%
alive), so his pension must be adjusted downwards ceteris paribus. Thus, formula (5) does
not  insure  individual  longevity.  This  can  also  be  seen  in  that  Ft  is  the  individual's
20property, rather than a collective fund managed by the insurance company as in variable
annuities and  CREF  annuities.  Expression  (5)  may also  be  used  by an  individual  to
calculate how much to draw down his voluntary savings each year.
In Chile r is currently set as the average observed return during the past  10 years
in  the particular  AFP where the  pensioner  is requesting  the programmed  withdrawal,
while {qx} is set by the regulators and is the same used to determine the annuity-related
liabilities of life insurance companies. In addition, the Chilean formula considers also the
payment of a small sum for funeral expenses. Administrative charges are deducted from
the monthly withdrawal, so the net withdrawals are below  those  indicated by  (5). If a
pensioner is  legally married  or has  dependents,  his programmed  withdrawal  must  be
calculated using  the joint  survival  probabilities,  so  a  sort  of  mandatory  bequest  is
involved.  The  bequest  is  inherited  by  the  relatives  that  survive  the  spouses  and
dependents. Argentina and Peru apply similar formulae.
In the United Kingdom the recalculation is done every three years, not annually so
(5) must be modified slightly. In addition, the income withdrawal  is temporary,  because
by age 75 the pensioner must have purchased an annuity. In the UK r is set as the gross
redemption yield  on UK  gilts (High Coupon,  15 years)  from  the FT-Actuaries  Fixed
Interest Indices, as published daily by the Financial Times newspaper for the 15th day of
the calendar month  preceding recalculation,  and then rounded  down to  the next  1/4%
(0.25%) (Finance Act 1995, section 58, Schedule I 1). Comparing with Chile, we observe
that r  is set  in  a  forward looking manner,  which is  better  than the  Chilean  method.
However. r is a nominal interest rate in the UK, rather than a real rate as in Chile. For
positive inflation this  implies  a higher  initial  pension  and  a steeper reduction  in real
benefits for the UK, and the slope of real benefits is random  as it depends of realized
inflation. In the UK, {qx} is set by the Government Actuary on the basis of a single life,
but the surviving spouse that inherits the fund must either purchase an annuity or request
income withdrawals.  Administrative  expenses  are  considered  by  reducing  Ft  by  2%
before use in (5), and there is no funeral benefit.
Programmed  withdrawal  should  not  be  confused  with  minimum  outgo  rules
applied to  third  pillar  pensions  in  order  to  limit the  fiscal  cost  of  tax  exemptions.
Examples are the minimum outgo requirements applied in the U.K. to personal pensions,
the  RRIF  option  in  the  Canadian  RRSP20 and  in  the  Czech  government-matched
voluntary pension plans introduced in 1994.
20 Canada introduced  RRSP  in 1957,  which is a fiscal incentive scheme for voluntary saving for
old age. Initially the only payout option allowed were annuities, but in 1978 the RRIF  was
introduced, which is a type of programmed  withdrawal. The Canadian RRIF  is a minimum
21The programmed withdrawal formula set  out  in (5) is not derived  from utility
maximization. It  is instructive to inquire what  are the preferences that  would make it
optimal.  The utility-maximizing  programmed  withdrawal  under the  constraint  of  no
annuitization, assuming a single pensioner that does  not desire to bequeath and whose
preferences can be described by an additive utility function of the CES type, solves the
following system2 l:
(6)  (x  )P(x)Ijli+rx)  .x  ]
110  z=x-l
Ft =EP(x)  H (l + r)
x=t  -=t
where the additional notation is:
rx = projected real rate of return earned on savings in future year x.
dx =  utility discount rate at age x, which describes the pensioner's preference for
consumption at age x as compared to age x+l.
s = parameter that  is both the elasticity  of intertemporal consumption and the
inverse of the degree of relative risk aversion.
Note that the second  equation is not weighted by survival probabilities. This is
necessary to make sure that the consumer will not die in debt. If preferences are such that
the utility discount factor dx coincides with rx, for all ages x, we find that the optimal
path solved out from (6) is:
(I10  _ =x-I 
(7) Pt  Ft - Y(qx)  H  (+r  ))  ;Bequest= Ft if the individual dies.
x=t  -=t
Thus, assuming that s = 1 (the Cobb-Douglas case) and that the regulators use the
term structure of interest rates observed in the market to set r, then (7) turns out to be
exactly equivalent to  (5). The programmed withdrawal  is optimal for these preference
parameters, under a no annuitization constraint.
The intuition for this result is that because of mortality risk, the consumer prefers
to consume more now - when he is alive - rather than later. This justifies the fact that the
withdrawal  limit,  not to a maximum  limit.  Some  provincial  governments  in Canada impose  a
maximum  limit to RRIFs that  hold funds  transferred  from pension plans under  their  jurisdiction,
for "consumer  protection"  reasons.  I am grateful to Keith  Horner  for this information.
21 See  Yaari  (1965)  equations  (2) and (19).
22programmed withdrawal pension falls over time provided the pensioner survives22, until
it hits  the  first-pillar pension.  The fact that older  pensioners  get  systematically  lower
pensions than younger pensioners is not deemed a defect, but rather the optimal policy for
the preference parameters indicated.
Empirical  estimates of  s are closer to  0.5  than to  1 (Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff,
1987). The programmed withdrawal  pension  in  (5)  falls too  steeply  and  bequests  are
smaller than what an individual with s = 0.5 would  choose. But (5) is not restrictive for
these  people,  as  it sets  only  the  maximum that  can be  withdrawn  each  month.  The
individual with preferences represented by s < 1 can save and reinvest the excess he does
not want to consume immediately. Thus, formula (5) constrains only individuals  with s
>1  23.
Overall, the programmed withdrawal has four drawbacks:
a) No portion of wealth is annuitized, so this contract is inefficient. The amount of
annuitization demanded does not depend of the degree of risk aversion, because  all risk
averse consumers want to diversify risk when it costs nothing to do so (Yaari, 1965)24.
b) Only a single bequest profile is allowed.  In contrast, annuity  contracts  offer
flexibility  regarding  bequests,  as  the  pensioner  may  stipulate  what  any  designated
survivor will receive, which may be in the form of a continuation annuity, a lump sum of
fixed  or variable size or  any other profile  of payments.  The programmed  withdrawal
forces  the pensioner to  leave bequests with  a  particular time  and risk  profile,  so it is
inferior regarding bequests.
c) In a programmed withdrawal it is impossible to  find a portfolio that reduces
investment risk to  zero. As the date of death is  uncertain, the pension  liability  for an
individual is random. Consider a case where the portfolio is invested in long-term fixed-
income securities with the same duration as the individual's expected pension liability. If
interest rates rise, then the value of assets falls and the expected pension liability falls by
the same amount, so expected payments for the  future remain the same. However, the
bequest amount remains subject to investment risk, because if the pensioner dies after the
rise in interest rates the bequest will be smaller.
d) In the case where the programmed withdrawal pays joint pensions for spouses,
as  in  Chile,  longevity  risk  is  diversified  among  spouses  which  increases  welfare
2 Under uncertain investment returns, the optimal path also depends  of risk aversion.
23  When individual preferences do not meet the condition that °x = rx, as is likely in the general
case, the analysis becomes more complicated.
24  The amount of annuitization demanded does not depend  of the demand for bequests either,
because that demand can always be served by an annuity  contract that includes bequests and
annuitizes the portion of wealth that is to be consumed.
23(Kotlikoff and  Spivak,  1981). However, it also  induces a betting  game  called tontine
between the spouses, because the survivor gets a bequest and increases his or her pension
in the next recalculation. Tontines are described in the Appendix. The tontine aspect of
the programmed  withdrawal increases individual risk, so welfare does not increase as
much as it could. In Britain income withdrawals are calculated on the basis of a single
life, so there is no explicit tontine. However, this is more risky because an implicit tontine
exists anyway, through bequests, while the individual-based calculation implies that the
pension starts higher than in Chile and that it falls more steeply conditional on survival of
both spouses.
4.5 Retirement, partial work and payment in annuity contracts
All  the  annuity  contracts  presented  in  Chart  I  can  be  adapted  to  individual
preferences in other dimensions, additional to  those discussed up to now. This section
summarizes the most interesting options.
(a) Bequests. The most popular bequest clauses in annuity contracts in the United States
are  those  that  specify  a  "minimum  guaranteed  period of  payment"(MGPP)  and  a
"minimum  guaranteed  reimbursement"  (MGR)25.  In  MGPP  the  insurer  guarantees
payment of pensions during a minimum number of years chosen by the worker, say 5 or
10, even if the annuitant dies before. The worker designates the beneficiary for the event
of an earlv death. In MGR, the insurer guarantees to continue paying pensions until the
cumulative sum  of pensions paid  equals the price of the annuity  (initial premium)  in
nominal terms, even if the annuitant died before. Annuitants are also allowed to change
heirs after the contract starts operation, except in cases where adverse selection might
occur.
It is  possible to  add  bequest clauses to  annuity contracts  in a  wide variety  of
formns,  with  certain or contingent amounts and  any desired timing.  Thus, the bequests
offered by annuity  contracts are superior to  the  single bequest profile  offered by the
programmed withdrawal. In addition, part of the demand for bequests may be satisfied by
inter-vivos transfers.
(b) Timing  of  premium  payments.  Our discussion  has assumed  that the  annuity  is
purchased with a lump sum at retirement and starts paying immediately. An alternative is
25 Black  and Skipper (1994).
24for the worker to buy an annuity  with a lump sum paid to the insurer before the annuity
starts paying, and invested by the insurer in the meantime. The date at which payments
start can be  chosen  by  the worker,  either  at purchase time  or  later  on.  The extreme
opposite alternative  if for payment to occur after the annuitant dies. For example, in a
reverse mortgage the individual obtains an annuity in exchange for bequeathing his or her
property to the insurance company.
More  generally,  an  annuity  can  be  purchased  with  many  small  installments
distributed over time, such as the contributions of each year.
(c) Pension age and deferred annuities.  Individuals are uncertain about when will they
want to start to receive pension payments, because they are unsure about when they will
wish to  retire.  Therefore,  workers  value the  option to choose  between early and  late
pensions.
However, this  flexibility is desirable only if adverse selection is properly taken
into account. This is because there are two extreme ways to achieve this flexibility. In the
saving method, the insurer invests the premiums but the worker refrains from locking into
an annuity, until the time in which he actually wants to start receiving a pension, keeping
open the option to ask for a lump sum withdrawal until that date. At that point he decides
whether to purchase an annuity, and if so, buys a single premium immediate annuity.
The altemative  is to buy a deferred  annuity much younger,  say at age 50. The
deferred annuity specifies a table of ages and pension levels, indicating the pension level
that will apply for each age in which the individual may ask for payments to start. The
amount of the pension  rises with the pension age chosen, in order to keep constant the
actuarial cost of the annuity. The crucial aspect of a deferred annuity is that the individual
locks some share of his wealth into annuity-type payments at an  early age, abandoning
the option of increasing the share of his wealth withdrawn as a lump sum (or in several
lump sums or in the form of bequests). The precise type of annuity can be selected later.
The principal  difference between  saving and  deferred annuities  is that deferred
annuities are less vulnerable to  adverse selection, as explained in  section 6 below, and
thus  are  less  expensive  for  workers  (Brugiavini,  1993). Another  difference  is  that
choosing a deferred fixed annuity implies larger demographic and investment guarantees
than in the saving method, so are more expensive on this count.
A third  difference is that buying  deferred annuities now implies  taking timing
risk, because the worker does not  know whether annuity rates will improve or worsen
thereafter. This  is mitigated in mixed approaches where the insurer offers a schedule of
annuity prices, but also allows the individual to opt for a lump sum withdrawal.
25Deferred annuities must also accommodate the fact that individuals go on saving
for old age after the purchase date (say age 50), so the size of the annuity that they will
actually  be  able to afford at age  65 is unknown  as of age  50. To accommodate  this,
deferred annuity contracts in the United States specify a table of conversion factors by
age. These factors indicate the amount of pension per unit of actual final savings, for each
age in which the individual may ask for payments to start.
(d) Partial retirement. Many older workers do not wish to withdraw from the labor force
at one stroke, but prefer to take up part-time jobs  until they become much older. In this
case, workers might prefer to start with a reduced pension to be increased later. Deferred
annuities  can provide the desired  time  profile  of  payments  by the  simple  method  of
allowing  the worker to switch  on  each tranche  of their  pension at different  ages.  The
conversion factor for each tranche depends of the age at which is turned on, and the table
of conversion factor is set at the age of purchase of the deferred annuity.
It is easy to accommodate the reduced financial needs of those who reenter the
labor force: the worker just  has to spend the excess pension amounts buying  additional
tranches of deferred pensions.
(e)  Escalation,  price indexation and  wage indexation  Some workers prefer  a  constant
annuity and others prefer a falling or growing annuities. Annuities provide the flexibility
to choose any escalation factor, which may even vary over time in a predetermined  way,
provided that the expected value of total payments is kept constant.
Indexation is different because it requires the escalation factor to  vary in a way
that cannot be predetermined at the time of purchase. Instead, the escalation factor tracks
some random variable according to a predetermined rule. Variable annuities provide this
service, as they allow the worker to choose the random variable according to which his
pension will be adjusted.
For example, real or "price-indexed" annuities follow the actual realizations of the
CPI. To obti :  this return pattern,  the worker may choose a variable annuity where the
underlying portfolio are CPI-indexed fixed-income bonds. If the insurer guarantees  that
the duration  of the portfolio will always remain  the same as the duration  of expected
liabilities, it is in effect offering a fixed real annuity.
Of course, CPI-indexed or  "real" annuities pay  an initial pension  that is smaller
than the one paid by a constant nominal annuity, but the latter pays less if the pensioner
survives to an advanced age. Because of this, it has been argued that it is not clear that
workers are better off with CPI-indexed pensions (World Bank,  1994, p. 330). This is a
26mistake, because as long as workers are risk averse, they are better off with a falling CPI-
indexed annuity (escalation factor less than one) than with a nominal  annuity, which is
subject to inflation risk.
Wage-indexed annuities are harder to produce in the financial market, unless the
government or other entity issues bonds indexed to average real wages. In the meantime,
a variable annuity invested in an underlying portfolio  built of equities and bonds issued
by  corporations  that  cater  to  the  consumer  good  sector  might  offer  good  tracking
performance. Such a variable annuity allows the pensioner to receive  an income that is
closer to being constant relative to average wages than a fixed real annuity.
4.6 Timing risk and portfolio freedom
As  mentioned before, many authors  have  argued that  a  weakness  of  defined
contribution pensions that  impose a deadline (such  as a fixed pension  age) to  buy  an
annuity is that they may  force the worker to transform  his accumulation at the wrong
time, say when annuity rates are relatively high.
We argue that this "timing" risk is not due to the deadline to buy annuities, nor a
weakness of the defined contribution pension approach, but a result of allowing workers
the freedom to reallocate their portfolio. To see this,  assume that  the accumulation is
partly invested in equities, and that the pension system forces workers to transform it into
an annuity. However, imagine that the annuity is a variable annuity  (explained in detail
4.2) which is invested in the same portfolio as the accumulation. It is clear that the fixed
conversion date (deadline) does not expose the pensioner to any further investment risk,
because the changes in price of both portfolios are perfectly positively correlated26.
Moreover, drops in the prices of underlying  equities are unpredictable,  no one
knows  whether a drop  in prices is "temporary", or whether  a  rise  in  annuity rates  is
temporary.
As long as the worker does not have the right to  change portfolio, he does not
suffer timing risk. This is the case in defined-benefit pensions, because pensioners are not
allowed to participate in the profits from exceptionally good investment decisions made
by the plan sponsor or, in  the case of fixed annuities,  by the  life insurance company.
Although defined benefit plans eliminate timing risk for the worker, this comes at the cost
of eliminating the upside  in investment risk. What is a timing  "risk" for some may be a
timing "opportunity" for others.  The freedom to reallocate a portfolio allows workers to
26  This argument can be extended to cover the risk that annuity conversion factors just increased
temporarily, by replacing the variable annuity for a CREF  annuity (see below).
27move away from the efficient frontier but, if the frontier is shifting, also allows them to
remain close to the efficient frontier risk.
Timing risk could be eliminated from defined contribution plans provided that: (i)
workers are forced to choose a single benchmark portfolio when they enter the pension
system. Members can be allowed to switch between trustees and fund managers, but only
among the funds that follow the initial benchmark portfolio; and (ii) the allowed pension
formulae passes along to pensioners the investment risk of the underlying portfolios (this
implies that all pensions must be of the variable annuity type, so other payout methods,
such as fixed annuities and lump sum withdrawals are prohibited).
The South American AFP systems meet the first condition currently, because each
AFP is allowed to manage a single fund, and the natural benchmark uses by workers to
compare AFPs is the average return of all AFPs. However, the second condition is not
met, as workers are allowed to  switch to  a fixed  income portfolio by buying  a  fixed
annuity. In Mexico, the first condition will not be met once fund managers begin to offer
several funds each.
However, it is not clear that elimination of timing risk is desirable. Many workers
change in their degree of risk aver'sion as they age or as they learn. Such workers may be
willing to bear some timing risk in order to obtain the portfolio they want.
If portfolio  adjustment is  deemed  necessary  because older pensioners  become
more risk averse, but the financial prowess of most workers is in doubt, it appears natural
to delegate the task of managing timing risk to professional portfolio managers. Workers
as of age 50 could be given the option to buy a "portfolio adjustment" service, for which
they would  have to  pay an  appropriate performnance  fee.  Such management contracts
might be the default option. For workers that insist in managing their portfolio freedom
on their own, it appears useful to consider a regulation to reduce the size of the gamble
taken each time they reallocate their portfolio. This regulation could limit the amount of
reallocation to a maximum percentage  of the portfolio per year, say  10%. Such a limit
assures diversification of the timing risks and also accommodates changing risk aversion
of members.
A mistaken  diagnosis  may  lead to  ineffective  policies.  The British authorities
introduced in  1995 a temporary programmed withdrawal option in the personal pension
system to allow workers to limit the "timing" risk. Pensioners are allowed choose to defer
their  purchase  of  an  immediate  annuity,  provided  that  they  take  the  programmed
withdrawal in  the meantime,  and  provided they  are  younger  than  age 75.  This  was
allowed  in  Chilean  AFP  system  since  1981, with  no  age  limit.  In  our  view,  these
28measures are likely to be ineffective regarding timing risk, because a change in portfolio
has to be made anyway and changes in asset prices are unpredictable.
Chile  also  allowed  further  combinations  in  1988  (and  Peru  in  1993)  by
introducing  a  hybrid  pension  option  in  which  the  worker  chooses  a  temporary
programmed withdrawal to be  continued  by a deferred  annuity bought at the time  the
programmed withdrawal started. This hybrid plans allows workers to lock in what  they
deem to be favorable annuity rates, but this implies betting on timing risk27. The Chilean
Superintendency proposed in  1996 to open  the option to  switch  to a short term  fixed
income portfolio up to 5 years before the regular pension age of 65. All these measures
are ineffective in eliminating timing risk, because a change in portfolio is made anyway.
5. Should lump sum withdrawals be allowed ?
These  final  two  sections  analyze  government  policy  towards  pension  design,
including issues of adverse selection.  When a worker retires from a mandatory pension
system, the range of payout options he may be allowed runs from lump-sum withdrawals
to  programmed  withdrawals  and  CREF  annuities  (see  Chart  1).  The considerations
involved in these decisions are numerous, and the literature on this topic is in its infancy.
In the survey that  follows we identify  two questions: should lump-sum withdrawals be
allowed  ?  If  the  previous  question  is  answered  with  a  negative,  then  should  the
programmed withdrawal be allowed ?
Lump-sum withdrawals give complete freedom to the worker regarding dispersion
of his life-long savings. In contrast, programmed withdrawals limit the rate at which the
funds may be consumed. As shown in section 4.4 the programmed withdrawal formula is
restrictive for preferences with s > 1, i.e. for those less risk averse, and also for those with
high utility discount rates.
5.1 International practice
Lump-sum  withdrawals  are not  allowed in  the  mandatory  pension  systems  in
Western Europe, Japan, the United  States, Canada, Eastern  Europe, the former Soviet
27Some  authors have argued  that this hybrid allows  workers  to insure their individual  longevity
risk without  buying investment  guarantees for the temporary period in which  a programmed
withdrawal  is received  (Superintendencias,  p. 134).  This is a mistake,  because  the same result can
be obtained  if the worker  chooses  a programmed withdrawal and later on buys  an immediate
annuity.
29Union, the Middle East. They are not allowed either in most of the old systems in Latin
America,  which  pay  benefits  solely  in  the  form  of  pensions.  There  is  an  ILO
recommendation not to pay lump-sum benefits.
The other extreme is given by provident funds. One of the defining characteristic
of provident funds is that they allow withdrawal of 100% of the accumulated savings in
the individual account in a single lump sum. Another characteristic is that individuals are
not  offered  an  annuity  or  programmed  withdrawal  option  by  the  social  security
institution, but rather must buy it by themselves in the financial industry, if available.
Provident  funds  were  set up  by  the  United  Kingdom  in  its  former  colonies,
including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Fiji, Kiribati, Western
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Nigeria,  Tanzania, Kenya,  Zambia, Uganda,  Swaziland, The
Gambia, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago 28. These schemes vary enormously in coverage
and the real rate of return earned. Only the provident funds in Malaysia and Singapore
have substantial national coverage and have paid a positive real rate of return, although
below  the one  available  in  the local financial  market.  In most  of  these  schemes, the
accumulation can be withdraw-n as a lump sum  at age 55. In the Hong-Kong pension
scheme to be implemented in 1998, the full amount of the accumulation is paid as a lump
sum at age 65.
The intermediate cases are the following: In Singapore, workers are required to
purchase a minimum pension before drawing the remainder of the balance (World Bank,
1994, p. 226).
In Australia there is a two-tier social security system. The "age pension" pays a
flat benefit to some 60% of the elderly population.  This benefit is means-tested and it is
financed  from  general  revenue.  On  top  of  it,  Australia  introduced  in  1993  the
Superannuation Guarantee,  a mandatory pension  system that aims to  finance earnings-
related pensions (non-means-tested), on a defined-contribution basis. The Superannuation
Guarantee pays a single benefit: a lump-sum when the individual worker reaches age 55
(which is being increased to 60 by 2020).
In the UK, the personal pension option allows to take up to 25% of the fund in a
tax-free payment, at the date of retirement.
The AFP systems of Argentina, Chile and Peru allow retirees to withdraw a lump
sum, provided the balance  in the individual account  is high enough  as  of the date of
pensioning.  The  amount  of  this  "free-disposal surplus"  is  the  difference, between the
balance in the individual account and a reference sum fixed by legislation. In Argentina,
28 World Bank (1994), p. 203 and Tables 6.2  and 6.3.
30the reference sum is the largest between 70% of the average taxable amount reported by
that  individual during  the  previous  five  years,  and  three times  the  universal  basic
pension29. In Chile, the reference sum is the largest between 70% of the average taxable
amount  reported by  that  individual  during  the  previous  ten years  and  120% of  the
minimum pension. In  Peru  the reference sum  is  80% of the average taxable  amount
reported by that individual during the previous ten years (Superintendencias, 1996).
In  addition, many  occupational  pension  plans,  organized by  employers,  pay
benefits as a single lump sum, or at least offer it as an option. This is also the case in third
pillars,  where voluntary  savings can be  withdrawn  as  a lump sum, but  paying  a tax
penalty.
5.2 Taxpayer protection and higher national saving
This  section  reviews  two  arguments  that  are  used  frequently  to  justify  a
prohibition of lump-sum withdrawals.
(a) Protecting taxpayers. The notion is that as long as workers receive an annuity, they
will not be able to qualify for social assistance and future taxpayers will be safe from the
claims of older poor people.
This argument is sometimes spiced by adding that some wily poor workers may
spend too fast to take advantage of the social assistance net provided by taxpayers. Of
course a truly wily worker does not have to make himself poor, but just  appear to do so,
by transferring his wealth to relatives or out of sight from the state. It has been argued
that this is the case in Australia, where a many workers that receive lump-sums from their
occupational plans find ways to become eligible for the age pension, even though it is
means-tested, a practice called "double-dipping" (Bateman et al, 1992).
Taxpayer  protection  has  deeper  implications  than just  prohibiting  lump-sum
transfers. Another implication is that as long as a  pensioner can finance by himself a
pension that is high enough to keep him ineligible for social assistance, he should not be
forced  to  contribute. This, is  precisely  the  design  of  the  Colombian  AFP  system,
introduced in 1994. In Colombia there is no mandate to build up of savings large enough
to pay an earnings-related pension.  Instead, workers become free from the mandate to
contribute when their accumulation can buy an immediate pension equal to 110% of the
minimum pension (Ayala,  1995). This approach could be extended by  setting workers
29 1n  addition,  the free-disposal  amount  cannot  exceed  500 times a universal  basic pension.
31free from the mandate to contribute when their accumulation can buy a deferred pension
starting at age 65 at least as large as the minimum pension.
Even when the state makes the mistake of forcing someone to save more than the
amount needed to protect taxpayers, the second best policy is to allow the individual to
withdraw as a lump sum all the surplus over that amount. This explains an aspect of the
design  of  the  other  South  American AFP  systems,  where  lump  sum  withdrawals  of
"surplus" savings are allowed only if the remaining amount is enough to finance a basic
or minimum  pension.
However,  the taxpayer protection  argument has  been  questioned by  those  that
point out that future taxpayers are free to be generous towards the poor (old or young),
and it is inappropriate to force someone to buy himself a pension only to "protect" other
individuals from being stimulated to be generous in the future (Ferrara, 1980). Moreover,
it has been argued that taxpayer protection helps the rich (who will pay more taxes in the
future), while the workers that are credit-constrained and forced to save are poor, so this
policy is regressive. Maybe the government should spend more in enforcing the means-
tests in its social assistance safety net for the old rather than attempt to protect taxpayers
in this round-about way.
(b)  Increase  national  savings.  It  has  been  argued  that  a  prohibition  of  lump  sum
withdrawals  delays  spending  of mandatory  savings,  increasing  the  stock  of  financial
assets owned domestically, as compared with an option like a lump sum payout at some
set age. This prohibition  is indeed effective in increasing savings if the financial market
puts some constraints  on the amounts of unsecured consumer debt each individual may
issue.
However,  increasing  savings cannot  be  the  ultimate  aim  of  economic  policy.
Forcing higher  saving could reduce national welfare, in addition to redistribute welfare
inequitably.
5.3 Flexibility versus paternalism
In this section we discuss what  seems to be a basic tradeoff,  between flexibility
and paternalism. It is thought that many workers that are myopic when young continue to
be myopic when old. One hypothesis is that irresponsible workers prefer to spend all their
savings during  their late 60's even if that means falling into poverty  afterwards.  Thus,
benevolent  legislators  should help  them  by  mandating  some  sort  of  phased  payout
(programmed withdrawals or annuities). Another argument in the same line is that since
32workers were already forced to save large amounts, legislators and the state is obliged to
assure an orderly and efficient disposition of those assets, preventing the losses caused by
myopic behavior.
The paternalistic streak in mandatory social security also appears in the bequest
area, which is represented by survivors' insurance. Such insurance does not limit itself to
create  an  estate  that would be  allocated  according to  the desires  of the bequeathing
worker. To the contrary, it usually forces the worker to allocate the estate in the form of
survivor pensions - not lump sums - and to the beneficiaries identified by the law  - and
nobody else.
Paternalism  is  consistent with  the  practice  in  Argentina,  Chile  and  Peru  of
allowing  a  free-disposal  surplus if  the  remaining amount  is  enough  to  finance  an
eamings-related pension, defined as a proportion of average past individual wages. This
requirement assures that the apparent past standard of living is preserved even for myopic
workers.
On the other hand, allowing lump-sum withdrawals allows individuals maximum
flexibility to  adapt their financial resources to their particular needs. For example, an
individual may need a lump sum to pay a health treatment that will improve his quality of
life, or may want to help relatives or friends in distress.
Other workers may want to start a small business in which they can earn a risk-
adjusted and amenities-adjusted rate of return which is much better than the one available
in the financial markets. This may be particularly important for the feasibility of plans to
retire gradually from the labor force.
However, these same arguments can and have been used to attack the mandate to
contribute during the working years. It appears difficult to reconcile a justification  of a
mandate to contribute with this defense of the freedom to withdraw the resulting savings
in a lump sum.
One compromise is to reduce mandatory contributions and aim for a relatively
small  replacement  rate.  This  can  be  achieved by  reducing  the  contribution  rate  (a
percentage of taxable salary) or by reducing the taxable ceiling, or both. As the relative
significance  of  mandatory savings  falls,  the  authorities can reduce  flexibility  in  the
payout formulae and limit the payout options more strongly, knowing that flexibility can
be  attained  anyway  by  disposing wisely  of  voluntary  savings.  Only  in  this  setting
paternalism could justify prohibiting lump sum withdrawals in most cases. A concrete
rule could be to allow a worker to take free-disposal surpluses only if his accumulation
can finance a pension larger than some fixed replacement rate, expressed as a percentage
of a representative number of his taxable wages.
33At this point it is useful to raise the related issue of whether a paternalistic pension
system  should  allow workers  to  get a  pension  as  early  as  they  wish.  Conventional
defined-benefit pension systems with salary-based benefit formnulae  have treated the early
retirement issue by applying  less than actuarial  reductions to  early pensions,  creating
implicit  subsidies to early pensions. Actuarially  equitable  systems strip  those  implicit
subsidies  away,  and  must  face  the  underlying  tradeoff  between  paternalism  and
flexibility.
The cost of freedom to ask for an early pension  is that myopic workers may be
enticed by the promise of a "double salary" for ages 55-65 (approximately), implying a
substantially reduced standard  of living after age  retirement. The  benefit  of  granting
workers this freedom is that they get the flexibility of choosing the degree and timing of
their withdrawal from the labor force. Again, it seems difficult to reconcile total freedom
to pension early with a mandate to contribute, which causes the same types of cost.
Early pensions are related to lump-sum withdrawals because one way to spend a
projected free-disposal surplus as of age 65 is to start a pension at an earlier age. Thus, a
compromise between paternalism and flexibility could be approached in the same way as
for lump-sum withdrawals: an early pension would be allowed only if the accumulation
can finance a pension larger than a fixed replacement rate of a representative  number of
his taxable wages, using the same percentage as for lump sum withdrawals30.
In order to coordinate these rules with the mandate to contribute in a consistent
way, that mandate should be suspended when the accumulation becomes large enough to
finance a deferred pension starting at age 65, which  is larger than a  fixed replacement
rate, using the same percentage as for lump sum withdrawals.
5.4  Technical difficulties in prohibiting lump-sum withdrawals
Consider a case where many workers want at least a portion of their savings back
as a lump sum. either because of a good reason or just because they are myopic. It turns
out that a fixed annuity option combined with free individual pricing of annuities allows
them to get their way. This has been found to be  the case in the annuity market in the
Chilean AFP system.
30 This "same percentage" rule is not currently applied in Chile. The percentage for a lump sum
withdrawal is 70%,  while the percentage for an early pension is 50%.
34To see this, we must explain first why most -but not all - annuity contracts are
long-term, or more precisely, irrevocable. If annuity contracts were reversible, at any
moment an annuitant might choose to surrender his contract to the insurer in exchange for
a lump sum, equal to the liability to him recognized in the insurer's balance sheet.
However, reversible annuities are vulnerable to adverse selection. An annuitant that
becomes afflicted with a mortal illness that takes some time to come to an end will have a
large financial incentive to surrender his annuity contract during that period. By doing
this he can obtain a lump sum based on average survival probabilities, while if he keeps
the contract the expected payments are just those based on his own survival probabilities,
which have just fallen due to the sickness. The financial incentive to surrender is
substantial3 1. To prevent this type of adverse selection, annuities are irrevocable, which
means they are long-term contracts.
Given the long term nature of the contract, it is an easy matter to attach a lump-
sum withdrawal to an annuity. The insurer must simply reduce the annuity amount to an
individual that asks for a lump sum amount, which in effect is the principal amount of the
lump-sum withdrawal32.
If regulations do not allow the company to  pay out a  lump sum directly to the
pensioner,  as  happens  in  Chile,  the  company  can  pay  the  lump  sum  as  an  extra
commission to a free insurance agent, who in turn passes it on to the worker. The worker
is then willing to accept the reduction in his annuity amount. This is current practice in
the Chilean AFP system (Martinez, 1997), where reported commissions to free insurance
agents have reached  in  some cases  the range  of 8-9% of the  accumulated  savings at
pension age. Apparently, the pure intermediation cost is close to 1.5% of the accumulated
savings at pension age, on average.
This  indirect  mechanism  is  not  identical  to  a  lump-sum  withdrawal  for  two
reasons. First, reserve regulations introduced  in 1988 force insurers to finance the lump
sum payment with equity capital, not with the cash income. Thus, the Chilean lump sum
might be best called a consumer loan, due to  the implicit margin  charged by insurers.
Second, the consumer loan is kept by the insurance agent if the pensioner does not know
about it. This latter outcome is highly inequitable  and suggests that Chilean regulations
will be reformed.
31 This can  be avoided in theory  by allowing  the insurer to reevaluate  the risk (the mortality  table)
of any annuitant  who seeks  surrender.  In this setting the insurer has an incentive  to cover  itself  by
assuming  the worst, which implies  a very low surrender value.  This is equivalent  to make  the
contract  irrevocable.
32 In the case  of an irrevocable  CREF  annuity, the management  company can finance  the
consumer  loan  by increasing  the commissions  charged on the pension.
35It must be noted that the current level of such hidden consumer loans in Chile is
reduced by the fact that the pension paid to each worker must be larger than 50% of the
average taxable salary of that worker, unless he is above age 65 (men) or 60 (women),
and most are below those  ages (see Table  1). It is likely that if this limit did not apply,
commissions to free insurance agents would be higher than 8-9%.
Among the methods to avoid this outcome, the following are available:
(a) authorize lump sum withdrawals.  If the worker is not informed, he is spared
from the loss of the loan to the insurance agent. Even if the worker is informed, he  is
spared the margin charged by insurers on consumer loans. The objection to this approach
is that the paternalistic concerns described before are abandoned.
A compromise  might  be achieved  if the lump sum  withdrawal  is  limited to  a
percentage of the accumulation. For example, in UK personal pension plans, 25% of the
accumulation  can  be  withdrawn  in  a  single  tax-free  amount.  A  problem  with  this
approach is that it does nothing  to  prevent a worker from  withdrawing more than the
maximum authorized percentage, as the indirect procedure observed in Chile is still wide
open.
(b) rely on  the limit  on  early pensions.  The Chilean  Association  of Insurance
Companies  (AIC)  proposed  recently  a  different  compromise,  based  on  the  early-
pensioning option. Early pensioning is allowed in the Chilean AFP system for those that
can buy an immediate annuity  which is at least as large as 50% of the average taxable
wage over the last ten years. Thus, one way to spend a projected free-disposal surplus as
of age  65  is to  start the  pension  at an  earlier age.  This  implies  that  those  "myopic"
workers that want a free-disposal surplus as soon as possible can get it in the form of an
early pension.
According to the AIC compromise, the amount that would be required to remain
in the account  after a free-disposal  surplus is paid would  be reduced from the current
level based on a 70% replacement rate, to make it the same to the amount required for
early pensioning, which is based on a 50% replacement rate33. Thus, workers that did not
to  get  a pension  as early  as  they  could are given the  right  to  ask for  all  the excess
accumulation in the form of an explicit lump sum withdrawal (Martinez, 1997).
This compromise relies  entirely on the limit on early withdrawals, which  is not
vulnerable to consumer loans because it is defined as a minimum replacement rate. The
33  Of course,  the  common  replacement  rate might  be set at 70% rather  than  50%.
36problem is that the compromise does not deal with the issue of consumer loans to workers
that do not get an early pension. After the legal age is met, the minimum replacement rate
for annuity purchasers is the minimum pension. Thus, workers that are unable to get an
early pension can still obtain a substantial consumer loan. Moreover, workers that might
get an early pension can choose not to do so but wait until the legal age, and then ask for
a large consumer loan equal to the excess funds after purchasing an annuity  sized as a
minimum pension.
(c) restrict the freedom to price annuities. This approach would attempt to prevent
unusually large drawdowns by requiring - for example - that the internal rate of return of
each annuity  sold be above some minimum linked to  current long-term market interest
rates. Such a minimum internal rate of return would not consider payments to insurance
agents as payouts and would be based on official mortality tables.
This  approach  implies  increasing  government  involvement  in  the  pricing  of
annuities, which may increase political  risk. In addition, it may be quite ineffective  for
technical reasons. There is evidence that lower-income workers have higher mortality, but
this is unlikely to be recognized in official mortality tables because of political reasons, as
is the experience in traditional pay as you go systems. Thus the annuities sold to the poor
by  competitive  insurers  should  be  higher  that  expected  on  the basis  of  the  official
mortality table, and they would exhibit unusually high internal rates of return even if no
consumer  loan is involved.  This  creates  the space for  substantial consumer loans  for
lower income workers, which are likely to be the most myopic.
(d)  prohibit  long-term  contracts  in  pensions.  This  approach  recognizes  that
significant consumer loans  cannot be  arranged if the  pension  management contract  is
short term. For example, the prograrnmed withdrawal formula does not offer consumer
loans. To  see why, consider a worker that accepts unusually high management fees  in
exchange in order to get a consumer loan. The higher fees must be paid over an extended
period  of  time to  allow  recovery  of the  consumer loan.  However, as  the worker  can
switch to a different provider within short notice, the probability of recovery is small and
the management  company is unwilling to extend consumer loans34. Maybe this  factor
helps  to  explain why programmed  withdrawals have such a small market  share of the
early pension market in Chile (see Table 1).
34  This result assumes that minimum  residence commitments are limited in duration or that exit
commissions in the event of early exit are limited in amount.
37Apparently, this  option would imply that insurance of  individual mortality  risk
would  not  be  available.  This  is  incorrect.  CREF  annuities  where  the  management
companies join a reinsurance pool for 100% of demographic risk can also operate with
short-term management contracts, which make consumer loans difficult. Within such a
reinsurance pool, a pensioner can switch management company with short notice, without
causing adverse selection. The reason is that the savings caused by members  that are
starting a terminal illness benefit the pool as a whole and not just  the last management
companies that served them (for a detailed presentation of this proposal,  see Valdes and
Edwards,  1997). Such  a  reinsurance  pool  is contemplated in  the  new  Bolivian  AFP
system.
This option implies restricting pension options to programmed withdrawals and
CREF annuities that have joined a mortality reinsurance pool. Therefore, the cost of this
option lies in that annuities that include mortality guarantees, such as fixed and variable
annuities, are prohibited. The workers that are willing to pay a risk premium to obtain
such guarantees could  be made worse off. Although the reinsurance  pool  could offer
mortality guarantees, it would be a monopoly supplier.
This appears to be just another facet of the basic dilemma of mandatory pensions:
paternalism  - in  this  case,  eliminating  consumer  loans  to  myopic  workers  - versus
flexibility. In this instance, the flexibility cost is compounded by restricting innovation in
the area of demographic guarantees.
6.  Should annuitization be mandatory ?
The previous section inquired whether lump-sum withdrawals should be allowed
in a mandatory pension  system, and we answered mostly in the negative. This  section
asks  whether annuitization would  be  mandatory  in  a  mandatory  pension  system,  or
equivalently, whether a programmed withdrawal option should be  allowed. In addition,
we discuss whether pension payments should be required to be either flat or growing in
real terrns, prohibiting annuity contracts that pay a decreasing real amount.
6.1 International practice
38Again, the countries that mandate annuitization in their mandatory pension pillars
are much more numerous than those that allow a programmed withdrawal option. In the
conventional  state-managed  defined-benefit pension  system  found  in  the  European
Union,  Japan,  Canada,  the  United  States, Brazil,  the  Philippines  and  many  other
countries, the only payout option is an annuity (with a discretionary guarantee). The same
happens in the funded and privately managed BVG pension system in Switzerland.
Among  the  countries  with  a  mandatory defined  contribution pension  systems
during the accumulation phase, Bolivia is the only one that mandates annuitization. This
is because the only allowed options are fixed annuities and CREF annuities35 (which
must join a national reinsurance pool for mortality risk). Poland is planning to mandate
fixed annuities in its funded pillar. The opposite policy is followed by the AFP systems in
Argentina,  Chile and  Peru. They do  not mandate annuitization because they allow a
programmed withdrawal option.
The British personal pension  system, created in  1988, introduced the "pension
fund drawdown" in  1995, but kept a mandate to  annuitize in a limited form. The law
requires pensioners in pension  fund drawdown to  switch to  an  annuity before age 75
(Planned Savings, 1996). This arrangement can also be described as allowing workers to
defer the purchase of an annuity up to age 75, provided they draw a monthly amount that
cannot exceed what is specified by the "pension fund drawdown" formula.
This overview shows that mandated annuitization is the general practice. It is only
with  the  appearance  of  the  newer  privatized  systems  that  this  mandate  has  been
questioned.
6.2 The adverse selection argument for mandating annuitization
It has been argued that if mandatory pension  systems allow workers that reach
pension age to choose from a menu of pension options that include non-annuitized forms
of spending, such as programmed withdrawals, significant adverse selection will result,
reducing the efficiency of the annuity markets and making all workers worse off.
The type of adverse  selection considered here is one where workers are more
informed about their own mortality prospects than insurers. This information asymmetry
means that insurers must price annuities according to average mortality (conditioned on
what may be observable to the insurer, such as age, sex and maybe income). But prices
based on average mortality implies a relatively high price for individuals that know that
35  The transition in that reform means that CREF  annuity markets in Bolivia will not open until
the year 2005.
39their mortality  is below the average.  Some  of those  individuals  choose  not  to  buy an
annuity and choose instead a programmed withdrawal. But then the average mortality for
those that do purchase annuities is higher than for the whole group, forcing insurers to
raise  prices  further.  This  generates  another  round  of  adverse  selection.  In  the  final
equilibrium the annuity market performs worse than optimally.
The evidence from the voluntary annuity market  in  the United States has  been
interpreted by  some  observers as proving  that  adverse  selection  is a  major  problem.
Friedman and  Warshawsky (1990) report that only 2 per  cent of the elderly  population
own individual annuities. Dollar sales (premiums) of individual  annuities in  1991 were
11.5 billion were just  0,6% of dollar sales of life insurance in the United States 36. The
small size of the voluntary market, together with the large  difference in mortality  rates
between annuitants  and non-annuitants, has been interpreted  as proof of serious market
failure.
However,  insurers have limited the impact of  adverse  selection by  introducing
deferred and  group  annuities. In  a  formal  model of  the  annuity  markets,  Brugiavini
(1993) finds that deferred annuities dominate immediate annuities, in the sense that only
deferred annuities are sold in equilibrium. The reason is that individuals when they are 50
have less private information about their mortality prospects at age 65 than when they are
65. In the United States, individuals with average earnings may hold up to 30% of their
wealth in occupational pensions, which are deferred and group annuities.
In addition, the small size of the voluntary market for individual annuities can be
explained by other factors, such as the following:
(i) Poverty. The price of an annuity that pays a replacement rate of 50% of wage income
is close to the price of a dwelling. However, most lower  income people  of ages 60-65
simply have not saved enough money to buy an annuity.
(ii) Family annuities. The fact that children and relatives offer implicit annuities  either in
exchange for a bequest or just out of generosity reduces the demand for market annuities.
This is specially so in areas of the world where extended families are tightly knit.
(iii) Social security . The presence of  mandatory annuities  paid by assistance-oriented
social security, including "first-pillar" pensions and free  health provision  for the poor,
also reduce demand for voluntary annuities.
(iv) Individual annuity prices might be high because of high selling costs. The technology
for selling individual annuities is expensive, as it requires a lengthy personal explanation
to each customer, usually provided by a salesperson. This has spawned the appearance of
36Life Insurance Factbook 1992,  pages 10 and 40, American Council of Life Insurance,
Washington  D.C
40other selling technologies, such as engaging the employer through a group plan, but these
technologies coexist.. 7 .
(v) High profit margins on marginal sales. The complexity of annuity products  might
preclude price competition and could allow much product differentiation. A high profit in
each additional annuity contract is compatible with free entry and normal returns  for the
marginal insurer if that profit is dissipated in high search costs and mobility barriers that
prevent new entrants from reaching the markets served by incumbents. The high degree
of price dispersion reported by Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) supports this  view of
the voluntary annuity markets 38.
(vi)  Investment  and  demographic  guarantees  are  too  expensive.  Annuities  include
contractual guarantees for investment and demographic risk, which  might be  in short
supply at the prices that retirees are willing to pay. On the other hand, it is generally
thought that pensioners are indeed risk averse, so they would be willing to pay substantial
premia. This is discussed again below.
This literature does not take into account that adverse selection should be smaller
in mandatory pension system as compared to voluntary annuity markets, because of the
following three reasons:
a) A mandatory pension system attacks directly one of the explanations for the
small size of voluntary annuity markets: that many workers reach retirement with little
savings with which to buy an annuity.
b) A mandatory system reduces adverse selection by providing information. Risk
classification according to income is easy in any mandatory pension system which allows
workers to  buy  annuities at  retirement,  because  the account  balance  is  a  very  good
indicator of lifetime  income and  is immediately available  to  insurers 39. It  should  be
noted that when insurers classify risks according to income they prevent the regressive
wealth redistribution associated to  a  merger  of the mortality  tables  of  low  and  high
income groups.
37 Jan  Walliser  reports  that commission  for insurance  agents  in the state of new York  are around
7%  of the annuity  premium (price),  in private communication.
3 8 The  accounting  data for the United  States  for 1989-91  reported by Vald6s  (1994)  shows that
sales cost  plus other costs  and accounting  profits were 17.4%  of premiums  of individual  annuities
and only 7.1%  of premiums  for group annuities.
39 To see the importance  of this factor,  Walliser  (1997a)  reports that in his simulations  women are
subject  to adverse  selection  loads  that are 20%  below  those of men,  and he attributes  this to the
lower  variance  in the factors  determining  survival,  especially  income,  for women.
41c) A mandatory pension system provides  information about who is about to buy
an annuity, allowing many insurers to reach each worker at the same time. The resulting
competition  may  be  less  subject  to  product  differentiation  than  the  small  voluntary
annuity market in the United States, leading to smaller margins and better prices.
The empirical evidence from Chile supports the notion that adverse selection is a
minor issue in mandatory pensions systems. In that country, a large proportion - 64% in
1996 - of those that retire  in the AFP pension  system  choose immediate annuities,  3%
choose deferred annuities and only 33% choose  programmed withdrawals (see Table 1).
Even in the  segment of  the  market where  the  law  requires low-income pensioners  to
choose the programmed withdrawal, the market  share of immediate annuities is 37%.
Table  1:  Market  share  of  pension  formulae:  Chilean  AFP  system  1996
(flow  market  share:  change  in  stock  of  live  pensioners)
Immediate  Programmed  Temporary P.W.  Total  Im. Annuit
Annuities  Withdrawal  + Deferred A. (d)  change  Mkt. Shar
(number)  (number)  (number)  (number)  (%)
42Age (a)  1,884  2,876  333  5,093  37%
Early (b)  9,348  542  48  9,938  94%
Disability  and
Survivors  2,965  3,824  195  6,984  42%
Total  14,197  7,242  576  22,015  64%
Decomposition  of  Disability  and  Survivors:
Disability (c)  190  759  177  1,126  17%
Widows  1,493  1,689  9  3,191  44%
Orphans  1,179  1,096  7  2,282  52%
Others  103  280  2  385  27%
Sources: Boletin Estadistico Superintendencia de AFP de Chile, N° 131 (p. 145) and N°
137 (p. 144). Notes: (a) the pension age is 65 for men and 60 for women. Those whose
pension is close to the minimum pension are forced to choose programmed withdrawal,
affecting the market shares for this group; (b) the early pension can be taken with no age
restriction, provided the pension is larger than 50% of average taxable earnings during
previous  10 years,  assigning zeros to  months  without contribution, and  120% of the
minimum pension; (c) the figure is for permanent disability (total plus partial). During a
transitory  period  of  three  years  the  disabled  worker  must  remain  in  programmed
withdrawal. The figure is net of deaths of those insured under the rules before Law N°
18.964  of  March.  10,  1990,  who  were  assigned  an  annuity;  (d)  The  Temporary
programmed withdrawal plus Deferred annuity is a hybrid option available since 1988.
When choosing it, the pensioner locks in a deferred annuity starting from a date chosen
by him.
To see the impact of such a large participation of annuities, assume that Chilean
pensioners exhibit the same dispersion  of mortality rates as those  in the United States,
where the 1% that buys annuities have a mortality rate which is half of the population
mortality (Mitchell et al, Table 2). Assuming a normal distribution of mortalitv rates we
can infer the standard deviation of mortality, which turns out to be 21.5% of the mean.
This implies that the 37th percentile of lowest mortality will have a mortality rate just 8%
below the mean, and on average, annuitants may have a 15-20 percent lower mortality
than non-annuitants.  The difference in mortality is even smaller for orphans and vanishes
for early pensions. This shows that in mandatory systems the inefficiency associated to
43adverse selection affects substantially fewer people than in the U.S. market and costs less
for each affected person.
The adverse selection that might remain in a mandatory pension  system where
programmed withdrawal is an option can be reduced further by allowing group annuities
organized  by employers and by  allowing individual workers to  sign deferred  annuity
contracts much before retirement, say as of age 50.  Thus we conclude that adverse
selection does not justify mandating annuitization.
6.3 Taxpayer protection and increasing national saving
It  may  be  argued  that  annuitization should  be  mandatory  to  protect  future
taxpayers  from  the demands of  the workers that choose  the  programmed  withdrawal
option and turn out to live more than expected, and thus have their pensions reduced to
very  low  levels  (see  section 4.4).  In addition,  some  wily  workers  might  choose  the
programmed  withdrawal  option  over  annuities  precisely  because  they  can  draw  on
taxpayer support if they die late and leave a higher expected bequest to their own families
if  they  die  early. As  mentioned  before, the  taxpayer  protection argument  has  been
questioned on the grounds that it leads to regressive policy.
An alternative route that avoids this criticism is to improve enforcement of  the
means-test in the social assistance safety net for the old, for those individuals that choose
the programmed  withdrawal. One way to do this might  be to  legislate that those  that
choose the  programmed withdrawal  option be  subject to  a  bequest tax  related to  the
expected value of state support they might receive if they survive too  much. This  tax
would be charged to the account balance at death. In this way, those that die early would
be able to leave a smaller bequest, and would finance state support for those that die late.
With such an amendment, the programmed withdrawal could not be used to exact more
taxpayer support.
It has also been argued that the promotion of national saving requires at least to
avoid a  mandate to  annuitize. The programmed withdrawal  option leaves  uncertainty
about of date of death with the worker, which might induce him to increase voluntary
saving  for the precautionary motive.  However, if individual mortality risk induces the
worker to save more, he can easily avoid this sacrifice by purchasing an annuity. Thus,
taking this argument seriously really leads to prohibition of annuitization and allowing
just  programmed withdrawals. This policy is likely to  reduce welfare, even if national
saving is increased.
446.4 Forced purchase of guarantees
When  a  mandate to  annuitize  takes  place  in  a  context  where  the  menu  of
admissible pension contracts is also tightly regulated, as is the case of Argentina, Chile
and Peru, then the combination of both restrictions might impose significant costs.
For example, if only  fixed annuities are allowed, then a mandate  to  annuitize
means  that  workers are  forced to  purchase investment  and  demographic  guarantees,
whose supply price might be higher than willingness to pay, as discussed in section 3. If
discretionary  guarantees  are  allowed,  then  moral  hazard  may  create  new  costs,  as
explained in section 3.
In that context, a non-annuitized option such as the programmed withdrawal is an
escape valve. It allows individuals an option to avoid the purchase of  investment and
demographic  guarantees. This,  combined with  the danger that  an uninformed  worker
might  lock himself into a costly option for life, were among the reasons that induced
Chilean  legislators to introduce the programmed withdrawal option in the AFP system
(Pifiera 1991, p. 69; Buichi  1993, p. 114).
A more efficient way to achieve the same result is to allow variable annuities and
CREF annuities. As these annuities do not include guarantees for investment returns nor
for  demographics, their supply price  is  not influenced by the cost  of  providing such
guarantees, and the cost of uninformed decisions is limited. On the other hand, as CREF
annuities diversify the individual mortality risk, they should be preferred to programmed
withdrawals by all risk-averse individuals.
6.5 Redistribution through actuarial regulation
Up to this point, this section has found that a mandate to annuitize is costless as
long as some safeguards are taken, such as allowing variable annuity and CREF annuity
options. In this context, a paternalistic concern for "myopic" workers implies prohibition
of  both decreasing real annuities and of programmed withdrawals.
However, this  section discusses whether the  authorities may use  their  role in
determining mortality tables to redistribute wealth among annuitants. It has been argued
that  allowing  workers a  non-annuity  pension  option  offers  them  refuge  from  non-
benevolent redistribution.
The government must intervene in the area of mortality tables because they are an
essential  input for solvency regulation for fixed and variable annuities, who guarantee
demographic risk.  In addition the  guarantee funds that  reinsure defined-benefit  plans
45impose minimum standards on the mortality tables used by the plans (Smallhout, 1996).
Now we consider non-benevolent uses of this power.
First, the authorities may choose to "invent" an artificial mortality table with the
aim of benefiting a particular group, which may or may not be deserving. For example, an
artificial mortality table may be issued to value liabilities caused by fixed annuities sold
to workers with more than 20 years in coal mining. This table would be artificial in the
sense that it is not based on hard actuarial data about that particular  group. In order to
benefit this group, the table must be artificially pessimistic, assuming excessive mortality
rates40.
Second, the authorities may impose  "price equality"  regulations,  which involve
artificially merging the mortality tables of distinct groups. As an  example, assume that
the authorities force insurers to charge the same to men and women of the same age and
smoking condition. This  is a form of price  discrimination,  as  it treats  unequals (with
respect to mortality) as if they were equals. In fixed, variable and CREF annuities, this
regulation forces redistribution between men and women annuitants, but the insurance or
management company does not suffer. As usual, this redistribution of wealth comes at the
cost of some distortions, such as incentives to rely more on salespeople because they can
be  directed to  reach  the  more  profitable  clients  (men)  rather  than  the  loss-makers
(women).
Thus, it is a fact that the authorities can redistribute wealth by manipulating the
mortality tables that are used in annuities. However, redistribution is also feasible in the
programmed withdrawal formula. A law may be passed that taxes the account balance of
all those workers in programmed withdrawal, and it may direct the revenue to supplement
the  pensions or  even  the  individual  account  balances  of  the  deserving  groups.  So,
programmed withdrawals do not offer refuge for the taxed groups.
However, taxes on programmed withdrawals must be more transparent regarding
the taxes and subsidies involved - closer  to explicit taxes  and transfers  financed with
general revenue - than manipulation of mortality tables. If the redistribution achieved is
socially desirable, then it should withstand a transparent public discussion.
Thus, for some political processes allowing workers a non-annuity pension option
could  serve the  role of  forcing a transparent  discussion  of  such  issues. For political
processes in which the taxed groups are well represented, the difference in transparency
may be  small. In this  latter case, the  conclusion  of this  section  is that  a mandate to
40Valdes and Edwards (1997)  argue that, because of competition and other adjustments, such an
attempt to redistribute wealth is ineffective in the case of fixed and variable annuities, but is
counterproductive in the case of defined benefit occupational plans and CREF annuities.
46annuitize  can be  made  costless  if  the  appropriate  safeguards  are  taken,  and  that  a
paternalistic concern for  "myopic" workers implies prohibition of  both decreasing real
annuities and of programmed withdrawals.
6.6 Paternalism and prohibition of decreasing real annuities
Annuitization provides  higher welfare that programmed withdrawals for all risk
averse individuals, so one might think that annuities would enjoy unanimity.
However, consider the case of an individual that prefers to consume more in the
present than in the future. This implies that he prefers an annuity whose size decreases
over time,  i.e. an escalation  factor smaller  than  1.0. But if  the  government prohibits
decreasing  real  annuities,  either  because  of  paternalistic  concerns  about  "myopic"
individuals that wish to dissave too rapidly, or because of fiscal concerns about too many
old  people  relying  on  the  minimum  pension,  a  programmed  withdrawal  may  find
demand.
A "myopic" consumer that does not have a demand for bequests would still prefer
a  flat real annuity over  a programmed withdrawal.  The reason  is that the programmed
withdrawal pension starts at the same level as a flat annuity (compare (2) and (5)), but the
former drops subsequently if the pensioner survives. The flat annuity pays a higher level
of pension in all periods except the first, in which the two pension amounts are equal.
However, a  "myopic" individual that wants both to consume  rapidly part of his
wealth,  and  also  to  leave  the  remainder  of  his  wealth  as  a  bequest  might  behave
differently. If he could choose freely, he would select an annuity combined with bequests,
where the part of his wealth devoted to consumption would pay a decreasing real annuity,
while the part of wealth devoted to bequests would be tailored to his wishes. But if he is
forced by the government to buy only flat real annuities, he might be willing to sacrifice
part of his desired pattern  of bequests in order to improve (from  his "myopic" point of
view)  his  pattern  of  consumption.  In  this  case,  he  might  prefer  the  programmed
withdrawal.
The implication is that a paternalistic government that  prohibits decreasing real
annuities should prohibit programmed withdrawals as well. If it does not do so, then
programmed withdrawals may offer an escape route for individuals that want to consume
relatively more in the present and at the same time  wish to leave some bequests. Thus,
paternalistic  concerns  recommend  the  prohibition  of  programmed  withdrawals,  in
addition to requiring annuities to be either flat or growing. In the  Chilean AFP system,
there is a regulation on annuities prohibiting decreasing real pensions. This is inconsistent
47with allowing the progranmmed  withdrawal, which on average also pays a decreasing real
pension.
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50Appendix: Description of Tontine-like annuity contracts.
A tontine  is a contract in which  a number of people invest some amount into a
partnership, which must reinvest the funds for a number of years, say 20. When that term
expires, the  proceeds are divided prorrata  between the surviving  partners. Thus,  each
partner is betting that he will live at least 20 years and the others will not. This class of
contract was invented by Italian banker Lorenzo Tonti41 and was first proposed as a form
of public debt to the French Parliament in  1653 by Cardinal Mazarino to shore up Louis
XIV's finances (Salas, 1957). It was first implemented in  1689 as a form of public debt
and  subsequently  became  popular  all  over  Western  Europe  (Espasa-Calpe,  1928).
Historically, the tontine was the first contract that applied the law of large numbers to life
contingencies.
In the annuity version of the tontine, the annuity pays out as a pension just  the
accrued interest on the aggregate investments, dividing it prorrata among survivors. The
pension  for  each  survivor  increases  in  amount  as partners  die.  If  the  management
company  (the government) gets back the total capital when all  die, then it must  offer
some  supplement  to  initial pensioners  to  make  the deal  attractive. Alternatively,  the
tontine is renovated with new generations of members and lasts indefinitely.
Tontines are excluded from Chart 1 because they are bets or gambles in addition
to being annuities.  For any additional year of survival the tontine does not pay just  the
amount needed to cover the additional living expenses associated to surviving, but pays
more. The excess is the prize in the implicit betting game.
Tontines have been outlawed in most developed countries due to several reasons.
First,  the  betting  aspect  of  tontines  generates  perverse  incentives  that  may  induce
assassination42. Second. their regulation is part of more general efforts to tax or regulate
gambling. Third, tontines have a reputation of being scams because in many cases were
badly designed and fell prey to adverse selection. For example, it was common that they
accepted members of different ages charging the same premium. In several cases tontines
were tied to pyramid-like scams, although this is not a logical necessity.
The programmed withdrawal formula  behaves like a tontine when there are two
or more participants in the pool43. When a worker is mandated or chooses to buy a joint
pension for the spouse, and it is calculated with the programmed withdrawal approach,
41 Apparently  he took the idea from  charitable organizations  in Florence,  Luca and Siena,  in
which the parents of newborn  girls  deposited a small  amount  in exchange  for a prize to be paid if
the girl  survived to marry at age  18,  in which case  the prize would be her dowry (Salas,  1957).
42 This problem may arise  also with ordinary  life  insurance.  To prevent it, most countries  have
introduced the doctrine  of "insurable  interest",  which  requires  life insurance  to cover  losses  only,
preventing  the payment  of prizes.  When  a tontine annuity  is stripped from its betting feature, a
normal annuity remains.
43 The  CREF  annuity also exhibits  tontine-like  behavior when the number of participants  in the
pool of annuitants falls  to two or a few people.  With more  than 20 members,  this has no practical
importance.
51the death of one member of the couple leads to an  immediate increase in the pension of
the surviving member44.
44 This implicit  betting  cannot be eliminated  without annuitization.  If couples  are forced to buy
separate individual  pensions,  the surviving  spouse  would still receive  an unintentional  bequest
from the dying one,  which would allow her to increase her pension.
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This paper considers  alternatives  to disperse  the accumulated pension
rights  during the liquidation phase  or retirement.  First,  the paper  classifies
the risks  that affect  pensioners,  discusses  the defined benefit  and defined
contribution options, and classifies  pension contracts  according to the
type of risk they transfer  to the worker. It considers  fixed annuities,
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adverse  selection is rejected on the basis  of Chilean evidence.
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